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NOTES

Other People’s Money
DRAWING THE CONSTITUTIONAL LINE BETWEEN
THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND CONSTRAINTS ON
OBSTRUCTIVE FEE ADVANCEMENT IN THE
WAKE OF UNITED STATES V. STEIN
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) issued
its federal prosecutors a written set of guidelines to assist them
in their investigation and prosecution of white-collar corporate
crime.1 Specifically, these guidelines, issued in a document
commonly known as the Thompson Memorandum,2 addressed
the question of whether and under what circumstances
Assistant U.S. Attorneys (“AUSAs”) conducting investigations
into white collar crimes committed by employees and executives should bring a formal charge against the company
itself.3 The Thompson Memo listed nine separate factors for
prosecutors to evaluate when making the decision of whether
or not to seek an indictment.4
In the AUSAs’ determination of whether to prosecute a
company, the Thompson Memo stressed consideration of the
1
Memorandum from Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney General to the
Heads of Department Components, United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003)
[hereinafter Thompson Memo], available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/business_
organizations.pdf.
2
Christopher A. Wray & Robert K. Hur, Corporate Criminal Prosecution in
a Post-Enron World: The Thompson Memo in Theory and Practice, 43 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1095, 1096 (2006).
3
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 1-2.
4
Id. at 3; see also Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, DOJ,
Statement Before the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate Concerning
“The Thompson Memorandum’s Effect on the Right to Counsel in Corporate
Investigations” (Sept. 12, 2006) [hereinafter McNulty Statement], available at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/testimony.cfm?id=2054&wit_id=2742.
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authenticity of a company’s “cooperation” with the government
investigation.5 One measure of this cooperation was whether
the company was advancing legal fees to its investigated
employees.6 If the company possessed no legal obligation to
advance legal fees to its implicated employees in connection
with the investigation, then the AUSAs prosecuting the case, in
accordance with the guidelines, were permitted to view the
advancement of legal fees as a failure to cooperate with the
government.7
However, this practice was recently condemned in a pair
of decisions issued by Judge Lewis Kaplan of the Southern
District of New York in United States v. Stein.8 In the first
decision, issued in June 2006 (“Stein I”), the DOJ’s practice of
considering the advancement of legal fees as a failure to
cooperate was challenged by former employees of accounting
giant Klynveld, Peat, Marwick, Goerdeler9 (“KPMG”).10 The
DOJ had begun an investigation of KPMG and its employees
over the “development, marketing and implementation of
abusive tax shelters.”11 The DOJ sought cooperation from the
KPMG employees suspected of misconduct as well as from
KPMG as a company.12 In doing so, the AUSAs leading the
investigation inquired into KPMG’s legal obligation to advance
fees to its employees.13 When KPMG could show a history of
advancing legal fees, but could not show any clear legal
obligation to do so, the prosecutors pressured KPMG into
limiting such assistance to its employees to demonstrate its

5

Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 6.
Id. at 7-8.
7
Id. However, as will be discussed infra in Part II, this consideration was
limited by certain factors in an effort to eliminate the risk of abuse by prosecutors. See
McNulty Statement, supra note 4.
8
United States v. Stein (Stein I), 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2006);
United States v. Stein (Stein III), 495 F. Supp. 2d 390 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). See infra note
23.
9
KPMG: Our History, http://www.kpmg.com/About/Who/History (last visited
Mar. 26, 2008); Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336.
10
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338; Lynnley Browning, Prosecutor Says KPMG
Move Held No Sway, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2006, at C13 [hereinafter Browning, KPMG
No Sway].
11
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336, 338 (internal citations omitted). For a more
detailed description of the illegal tax shelter abuses alleged by the government, see
David Cay Johnston, U.S. Accuses 2 Audit Firms of Assisting Tax Violations, N.Y.
TIMES, July 10, 2002, at C1.
12
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
13
Id.; Browning, KPMG No Sway, supra note 10.
6
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cooperation with the government and possibly avoid an
indictment against the company.14
The KPMG defendants claimed, and the Stein I court
agreed, that the pressure placed on KPMG to disregard its
“long-standing policy”15 of advancing legal fees to employees
being investigated or indicted deprived the employees of
their Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel.16
Alternatively, the court held that this pressure violated the
defendants’ substantive due process right to a fair criminal
trial under the Fifth Amendment.17 The court noted that:
KPMG refused to pay because the government held the proverbial
gun to its head. Had that pressure not been brought to bear, KPMG
would have paid these defendants’ legal expenses. Those who commit
crimes—regardless of whether they wear white or blue collars—
must be brought to justice. The government, however, has let its zeal
get in the way of its judgment. . . . Defendants had . . . an
expectation that their expenses in defending any claims or charges
brought against them by reason of their employment by KPMG
would be paid by the firm. The law protects such interests against
unjustified and improper interference.18

Because the court intended its substantive due process analysis
to be used only as an alternative in the event that a reviewing
court disagreed with its Sixth Amendment analysis,19 this
Note will focus primarily on the protections the Stein court
recognized under the Sixth Amendment.
In its decision in Stein I, the court first determined
that KPMG would have advanced—and may even have been
legally obligated to advance—legal fees to its employees.20
This determination was based on a state statute that gives
companies the authority to indemnify their employees through
means which include the advancement of legal fees, as well as
on KPMG’s history of paying the legal expenses of its partners
and employees incurred as a result of their employment,

14

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342, 344.
Id. at 352; Browning, KPMG No Sway, supra note 10.
16
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336; Lynnley Browning, U.S. Tactic on
KPMG Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2006, at C1 [hereinafter Browning, Tactic
Questioned].
17
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356, 360; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390,
409 n.80 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
18
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336, 366-67.
19
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 409 n.80.
20
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353, 356; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at
394, 409.
15
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regardless of cost.21 Next, the court found that the inherent
threat of an indictment based on the guidelines in the
Thompson Memo and the pressure supplied by the AUSAs’
reinforcement of that threat caused KPMG to depart from its
usual policy of paying legal fees and expenses.22
These holdings were confirmed in July 2007 when
the court issued a second opinion (“Stein III” 23) in which it
dismissed the indictments of a number of the defendants and
rejected arguments by the government challenging the correctness of the court’s rulings in Stein I.24 The Stein III court
reinforced its holdings in Stein I by pointing to additional facts
that showed KPMG’s intent and desire to cover its employees’
legal fees.25 However, the Stein decisions are subject to a
number of weaknesses that limit their effectiveness in
preventing government prosecutors from infringing on the
right to counsel while preserving the government’s interest in
prosecuting white collar crime.26
First, in arriving at its conclusions, the court was forced
to engage in a long, murky, and protracted analysis of the
facts27 that may subject its conclusions to alternative interpretation by other courts facing similar claims in the future.28
Second, the claim of prosecutorial misconduct presented by the
21

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355-56; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 405-09.
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
23
The second decision is referred to as Stein III for purposes of consistency
with the court, which referred to a July 2006 decision concerning suppression of
statements made by the KPMG defendants as “Stein II.” See infra note 198.
24
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 393-94.
25
Id. at 407-09.
26
The Stein I court held that the defendants’ right to “obtain and
use . . . resources lawfully available to him or her” in preparing a defense “free of
knowing or reckless government interference” is a fundamental constitutional right
protected under notions of substantive due process. 435 F. Supp. 2d at 360-62. Any
government infringement of this right is subject to a strict scrutiny standard of
review—the government’s actions must be “narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling
government interest.” Id. at 362. As the Sixth Amendment right to counsel has also
repeatedly been declared “fundamental” by the Supreme Court, see Cuyler v. Sullivan,
446 U.S. 335, 343 (1980); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 32 (1972); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963), any government interest which would impede
this right of a criminal defendant must also be compelling.
27
The difficulty of the analysis for the Stein court is demonstrated by its
reliance in Stein III on additional pieces of evidence, at least one of which had not been
discovered, when it confirmed its conclusions and holding in Stein I. See Stein III, 495
F. Supp. 2d at 407.
28
See Browning, Tactic Questioned, supra note 16 (reporting that while the
district court ruling applies only to the KPMG case, it carries extra weight because of
the large number of “high profile white-collar and corporate fraud cases” presented
before the federal court in Manhattan).
22
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defendants in the Stein cases still leaves courts unable to
protect the right to the assistance of counsel for defendants
until after that right has been violated. Finally, as in Stein, the
need to hear such claims may force courts into the unwanted
position of intruding on a prosecutor’s broad discretion to
determine whether or not to seek an indictment.29 Since the
decision to seek an indictment rests with the executive branch,
judicial review of a prosecutor’s authority threatens to undermine the doctrine of separation of powers.30
This Note will argue that while modern application
of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel31 could cover a
company’s agreement to advance attorney’s fees in certain
instances, the Stein decisions are only minimally effective in
ascertaining where such coverage applies. First, the Stein
decisions do not clearly distinguish between conduct constituting impermissible government interference with the right
to counsel and voluntary choices of companies denying
advancement to employees based on decisions which serve the
companies’ best interests.32 This requires an alternative
solution to provide prosecutors with a clearer gauge of where
government conduct exceeds the proper balance between
prosecution of white-collar crime and individual constitutional
rights. Second, such a solution must not excessively intrude on
the government’s compelling interest in prosecuting whitecollar crime and limiting obstructive conduct.
Part II of this Note will review the history of the DOJ’s
implementation of the guidelines set forth in the Thompson
Memo and recap the history of the guidelines as set forth five
years before the DOJ brought action against the KPMG
employees. A brief history of the KPMG investigation will be
provided to re-establish the setting that brought these issues to

29

See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
See infra notes 261-262 and accompanying text.
31
Much has been written regarding the intent behind the right to counsel in
the years preceding and immediately following American independence. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM M. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 14-24 (1955);
ELLIOTT EVANS CHEATHAM, A LAWYER WHEN NEEDED 14, 49-50 (1963); William M.
Beaney, The Effective Assistance of Counsel, in ARTHUR L. HARDING ET AL.,
FUNDAMENTAL LAW IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS 39, 39-40 (1959). However, this Note
will primarily focus on the last seventy years of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence
dealing with the right to counsel.
32
See Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84 (Del. Ch. 1992)
(explaining that Delaware law leaves to the business judgment of the board “the task of
determining whether . . . advancement of expenses would on balance be likely to
promote [a] corporation’s interests”).
30
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light, including specific incidences within the investigation that
gave rise to some of the claims of abuse and misconduct that
this Note’s proposal attempts to remedy. Part III will briefly
restate the scope, application, and limits of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to highlight the protections guaranteed
by the right. Part III will also discuss the district court’s
application of the right to the facts in the Stein cases.
Part IV will analyze the district court’s decisions in
Stein I and III. This analysis will highlight the weaknesses of
the court’s decisions and focus on balancing the need to grant
prosecutors the necessary discretion to determine whether to
bring charges while protecting individuals and companies from
potential abuse of that discretion. This section will include
analysis of state statutes addressing indemnification and
advancement of legal fees to officers and employees.
Part V will propose a bright-line alternative to aid
courts and prosecutors in determining when a defendant’s right
to the assets of a third party for the payment of legal fees is
protected under the Sixth Amendment and when (and under
what circumstances) government interference is appropriate.
The proposal will resurrect a portion of the AUSAs’ claim that
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not cover “other
people’s money” in the form of a legislative enactment
permitting prosecutors to use preliminary injunctive restraints
that are already in use with current federal forfeiture
provisions.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

The Thompson Memorandum

Formally titled “Principles of Federal Prosecution of
Business Organizations,” the Thompson Memo was issued by
Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson as a “revised set
of principles to guide33 Department Prosecutors as they make
33
While the memo explicitly states that the principles are intended as a
“guide” for prosecutors, some analysts, as well as the court in Stein have concluded
that the principles were used as hard rules in their assessments of corporate
cooperation and determinations to bring an indictment. See, e.g., Lynnley Browning,
Judges Press Companies That Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at C1
[hereinafter Browning, Judges Press] (pointing out that while prosecutors claim that
the Thompson Memo was meant to serve as an internal guide for prosecutors, many
prosecutors use the guidelines “like a bible” when investigating a company); Stein I,
435 F. Supp. 2d at 338 (“[T]he Thompson Memorandum is binding on all federal
prosecutors. Thus, all United States Attorneys now are obliged to consider the
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the decision of whether to seek charges against a business
organization.”34 It was issued in the wake of a number of
corporate scandals involving high-profile companies such as
MCI WorldCom, HealthSouth, and Adelphia35 that followed
shortly after the collapse of Enron.36 These scandals “cost
investors billions of dollars and thousands of workers lost their
jobs,”37 and they compelled the DOJ to take action against the
corporate malfeasors.38
While guiding prosecutors in their consideration of
seeking an indictment against a company was at least one
purpose of the Thompson Memo,39 one of its primary purposes
was to “increase[] emphasis on and scrutiny of the authenticity
of a corporation’s cooperation” with the DOJ’s investigation.40
Prosecutors from the DOJ had always sought cooperation
from companies during the investigation of potentially illegal
conduct,41 but the content of the Thompson Memo lends itself
advancing of legal fees by business entities . . . as at least possibly indicative of an
attempt to protect culpable employees and as a factor weighing in favor of indictment
of the entity.” (footnote omitted)).
34
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, cover page. The memo was actually a
“modest revision” of a document issued in June 1999 by then-U.S. Deputy Attorney
General Eric Holder entitled “Federal Prosecution of Corporations,” commonly referred
to as the “Holder Memo.” Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 336; see also Wray & Hur, supra
note 2, at 1099 (characterizing the Holder Memo as the first “uniform policy on
corporate prosecution”).
35
Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1100.
36
Browning, Judges Press, supra note 33. Speaking before Congress, Deputy
Attorney General Paul McNulty called the year 2002 “a time of great concern to . . .
Congress and to American workers and investors” based on the reduction in the
public’s trust in corporate America due to the “large-scale bankruptcies of companies
like Enron.” McNulty Statement, supra note 4. “The guidance contained in the
Thompson Memorandum . . . must be viewed in the context of these massive corporate
scandals.” Id.
37
Browning, Judges Press, supra note 33.
38
As McNulty testified:
The American people and their representatives . . . in Congress demanded
that those responsible for corporate malfeasance be brought to
justice . . . . The Department of Justice responded to this crisis in corporate
America with vigor and action . . . . Since 2002, the Department of Justice
obtained more than 1000 corporate fraud convictions and convicted more
than 160 corporate presidents and executive officers.
McNulty Statement, supra note 4.
39
The Thompson Memo also discussed the important public benefits that
would flow from corporate prosecution, such as the likelihood that the company will
take “immediate remedial steps,” specific deterrence in the form of a changed culture in
the indicted corporation, and minimized risks of large-scale public harm, such as
environmental crimes and financial fraud. Thompson Memo, supra note 1, cover page.
40
Id.; Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1097, 1135.
41
See McNulty Statement, supra note 4 (calling the Thompson Memo “a
time-tested and fair summary of the factors a prosecutor considers in charging a
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to the inference that the DOJ and Thompson had become
skeptical of the cooperation they were receiving: “Too often
business organizations, while purporting to cooperate with a
Department investigation, in fact take steps to impede the
quick and effective exposure of the complete scope of
wrongdoing under investigation.”42
The Thompson Memo, which acknowledged that only
a minority of cases would result in a company itself being
subjected to criminal charges,43 listed a number of factors for
prosecutors to consider in determining whether to bring
charges against an entity.44 Some of these factors were identical
to those that prosecutors were already using to determine
whether to bring charges against individuals, such as
sufficiency of the evidence, success at trial, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and alternative consequences of conviction.45
However, due to a company’s status as a “corporate person,”
additional factors were given for consideration.46 These factors
included, but were not limited to, the nature and seriousness of
the offense, the extent of the wrongdoing within the company,
the history of such conduct, voluntary disclosure of any
wrongdoing by the company and willingness to cooperate,47
corporate compliance programs, remedial measures (including
corporate entity [that] commits to paper what good prosecutors have been doing for
decades”).
42
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, cover page. This skepticism was even
shared by attorneys working as in-house counsel for private companies under
investigation as little as three months prior to the decision handed down in Stein I. See
Nathan Koppel, U.S. Pressures Firms Not to Pay Staff Legal Fees, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28,
2006, at B1 (quoting Harvey Wolkoff, an in-house lawyer for Enterasys Networks, Inc.,
supporting government requests that Enterasys challenge Delaware law authorizing
advancement of legal fees to the defendants: “‘If [the defendants] did something
criminal, why should’ their legal fees get reimbursed?”).
43
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, cover page. This was in part due to the
recognition that a company “can act only through individuals,” and that “imposition of
individual criminal liability may provide the strongest deterrent against future
corporate wrongdoing.” Id. at 1; see also Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1106-07.
44
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 3.
45
Prosecutors had already been instructed to consider these factors in
seeking indictments against individual defendants, as the factors had already been
listed in the United States Attorneys Manual. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S.
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-27.220 (2007).
46
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 3.
47
In evaluating cooperation, the prosecutors could also consider whether a
company waived corporate attorney-client and work product protection. Id. at 3. One
reason the DOJ began looking at waivers of privilege and work product is that in
previous corporate criminal investigations, counsel for the companies would run all of
the companies’ documentation through their in-house legal department so as to claim
attorney-client or work product protection for documentation detailing routine business
activity as well as accounting and financial records. McNulty Statement, supra note 4.
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termination of responsible employees and making restitution),
and the collateral effects of a potential indictment (including
harm to shareholders, pension holders, and non-culpable
employees).48
In elaborating on the consideration that should be given
to a company’s level of cooperation, the Thompson Memo
acknowledged the difficulties of conducting an investigation of
a company, such as ascertaining who the culpable individuals
are, their location, and the location of records.49 These difficulties made obtaining company cooperation so critical that
the Memo referenced guidelines for prosecutors to consider
in determining whether to offer the company immunity or
amnesty in the form of a non-prosecution agreement.50 The
Memo also stated that prosecutors should assess whether the
company “appears to be protecting its culpable employees.”51
This protection referred to company conduct that included
advancing attorney’s fees, retention of employees without
sanction for any misconduct, and providing information to
employees about the government’s investigation.52 As it
pertained to legal fees, if prosecutors felt that such protection
was being used to limit or prevent the flow of truthful communication from employees to the government, or to protect the
culpable employees or the company, such provision of fees could
be weighed in evaluating the adequacy of cooperation.53
48
49

Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 3.
Id. at 6.

It will often be difficult to determine which individual took which action on
behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility may be shared
among operating divisions . . . and records and personnel may be spread
throughout the United States . . . . Where the criminal conduct continued
over an extended period of time, the culpable or knowledgeable personnel
may have been promoted, transferred, or fired, or they may have quit or
retired. Accordingly, a corporation’s cooperation may be critical in identifying
the culprits and locating relevant evidence.
Id.
50

Id.; Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1103-04.
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 7.
52
Id. at 7-8. The Memo also addressed other concerns regarding whether an
investigated company is engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation, such as
making overly broad assertions of corporate representation of employees, and issuing
directions to its employees not to cooperate. Id.
53
McNulty Statement, supra note 4. The DOJ was primarily concerned about
the abuse of fee advancement as a means of obstructing the government’s investigation
in conjunction with other indications of non-cooperation, such as “overly broad
assertions of corporate representation of its employees, a refusal to sanction wrongdoers, a failure to comply with document subpoenas and a failure to preserve
documents.” Id. To the extent that these other indicators were not present, the
51
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The Investigation of KPMG54

The DOJ used the guidelines set out in the Thompson
Memo when it began its investigation of KPMG.55 In October
2001, the IRS initiated an investigation into the creation of and
failure to register a number of “abusive” tax shelters that
KPMG had participated in forming beginning in 1997.56
Following the initiation of the investigation, as well as the
issuance of a number of summonses for information on
these abusive shelters,57 a Senate subcommittee launched
another investigation “into the development, marketing and
implementation” of these shelters.58 The subcommittee found
that KPMG sold a number of these illegal shelters to at least
350 people in the four year span from 1997 to 2001.59 In
addition, KPMG earned $124 million in fees, while depriving
the Treasury of at least $1.4 billion in unpaid taxes.60 These
investigations brought much negative attention to KPMG.61
As concern grew regarding the fallout from the
conclusions of the Senate subcommittee and IRS investigations, KPMG chair Eugene O’Kelly retained a private law firm
in an effort to develop a “cooperative approach” with the
government.62 This approach included the decision to ask some
of KPMG’s senior partners to vacate their positions within the
company, including deputy chair and Chief Operating Officer
Jeffrey Stein, vice-chair of tax services Richard Smith, and a
partner in personal financial planning, Jeffrey Eischid.63
However, in terminating their employments, KPMG negotiated
government would not maintain such concern with a company’s advancement of legal
fees. Id.
54
For purposes of simplicity, Part II.B will assume many of the facts of the
investigation as they were determined by the court in Stein I and later in Stein III.
55
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
56
Id. at 338; see also Johnston, supra note 11; Superseding Indictment at 3637, Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330 (No. S1 05 Cr. 0888) [hereinafter KPMG Indictment].
57
KPMG Indictment, supra note 56, at 37.
58
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
59
Lynnley Browning, KPMG Says Tax Shelters Involved Wrongdoing, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2005, at C1.
60
Id. Some sources have reported claims by prosecutors that the shelters cost
the United States even more than this amount. See Bloomberg News, KPMG Is Not
Required to Pay Legal Fees, U.S. Contends, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2006, at C9 (reporting
that the shelters generated over $11 billion in falsely claimed tax losses, and cost the
government at least $2 billion in revenue).
61
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 338-39.
62
Id. at 339.
63
Id.
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severance agreements with at least two of these individuals,
specifically Messrs. Stein and Smith.64
Mr. Stein, who held a senior position with the company,
worked out an agreement with KPMG in which his departure
would be “cushioned substantially.”65 Under this agreement,
Mr. Stein would be retained as a consultant for three years
with a monthly compensation of $100,000, would release all
claims against the firm and its partners, and would be provided
legal representation at the expense of the firm by counsel
acceptable to both him and the firm in any suits brought
against KPMG or its personnel and himself.66 KPMG would
also continue to cover Mr. Stein under its Professional
Indemnity Insurance Program against any claims arising from
his role with the company.67 KPMG’s agreement with Mr.
Smith contained an essentially identical clause, by which the
firm agreed to pay the costs of Smith’s defense.68
In early 2004, the IRS concluded its investigation and
made a criminal referral to the DOJ recommending prosecution
of KPMG.69 The DOJ, in turn, referred the case to the United
States Attorney’s Office (“USAO”) in February of that year.70
Upon learning of the criminal referral, but prior to any meeting
with the USAO, KPMG issued a voicemail message to its
partners stating that it would pay for “competent counsel” for
any present or former members of the firm who were asked to
appear before the USAO in relation to the investigation.71 The
message made no mention of any conditions on the payment,
nor did it mention any limits on the amount of legal expenses
KPMG would pay.72
In the initial discussions between the USAO and the
retained counsel for KPMG, the AUSAs immediately inquired
whether KPMG was paying the legal fees of the investigated
64

Id.; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
66
Id. It was also agreed that in the event that only Mr. Stein was named as a
party in any suit arising out of his actions with the company, the counsel need only be
reasonably acceptable to him. Id.
67
Id. at 339 n.25; see also Lynnley Browning, Prosecutor Denies Pressure on
KPMG to Cut Off Legal Fees, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2006, at C7 [hereinafter Browning,
Prosecutor Denies Pressure] (reporting the value of the severance package to Mr. Stein
at between $8 and $10 million).
68
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 408.
69
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
70
Id. at 340.
71
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
72
Id.
65
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employees and what obligations or agreements it had made to
do so.73 KPMG’s counsel indicated that the company’s objective
was not to protect its employees, but rather to save itself out of
the fear that a formal indictment would be disastrous for the
company, forcing the firm out of business.74 As such, while
lawyers for KPMG told the AUSAs that paying legal fees for
employees had been the firm’s “common practice,”75 the vagueness of the firm’s partnership agreement and the Delaware law
governing the agreement gave KPMG the discretion to make
its own determination.76 Counsel for KPMG also indicated that
in spite of this “common practice,” it “still was checking on its
legal obligations,” and would not pay legal fees “for employees
73
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346. Prior to the court’s decision in Stein I, the
parties had stipulated that before February 2004, KPMG had a “longstanding
voluntary practice” of advancing and paying legal fees

without a preset cap or condition of cooperation with the government, for
counsel for partners, principals, and employees of the firm in those situations
where separate counsel was appropriate to represent the individual in any
civil, criminal or regulatory proceeding involving activities arising within the
scope of the individual’s duties and responsibilities as a KPMG partner,
principal, or employee.
Id. at 340 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted).
74
Id. at 341. Stein I references the widely discussed and accepted conclusion
that KPMG’s primary concern was making sure it did not suffer the same fate as its
competitor, Arthur Andersen LLP, id., which “imploded shortly after its indictment in
2002 for allegedly obstructing the government’s investigation of fraud at Enron Corp.”
Koppel, supra note 42; see also Browning, Judges Press, supra note 33 (calling a formal
indictment “a virtual death knell for many companies, as it was for the accounting firm
Arthur Andersen”); Bruce D. Fisher, Andersen v. U.S.: A Shift in the Legal Winds for
Public Auditors? TENN. BAR J., Nov. 2005, at 22 (stating that “mere indictment—
formal criminal accusation—proved to be the Andersen firm’s downfall” because
following the indictment, “Andersen’s clients deserted it, and the firm eventually filed
for bankruptcy and thousands lost their jobs and pensions”). The consequences of such
negative publicity can be further seen by the fact that after Andersen was both indicted
and convicted on trial, even the over-turning of the conviction by the United States
Supreme Court “probably does not portend a significant change in the legal winds for
either Andersen or for the thousands of former Andersen employees.” Id. at 32.
75
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342. KPMG claimed, and the DOJ did not
dispute, that it could not recall any partner, principal, or employee who had been
indicted for conduct arising within the scope of the duties of their position since two
previous employees (both partners) were indicted in 1974. Id. at 340. Though the
company could locate no documentation to support its claim that it paid pre- and postindictment fees on behalf of those individuals, both sides stipulated that litigation
expenses for those employees were covered by KPMG. Id.
76
Id. at 342. Even after Stein I, the DOJ still emphasized that where a
company has discretion in its business decision not to advance legal fees, it is the
company’s choice alone and is not controlled by the prosecution. McNulty Statement,
supra note 4, at 7. “Experienced and sophisticated counsels weigh what is in the best
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. . . . With the level of skill of opposing
counsel we have in these cases, it is wrong to suggest that we make their decisions for
them.” Id.
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who declined to cooperate with the government . . . as long as
it had discretion to take that position.”77 Sensing the government’s displeasure at the idea of severance packages for
suspected individuals, KPMG chose not to sign the agreement
it had negotiated with Richard Smith, which was still pending
at the time of the initial meeting with the AUSAs.78
Shortly thereafter, counsel for KPMG reported to the
USAO that the firm did not believe any “binding legal
obligation to pay legal fees” existed, “but that ‘it would be a big
problem’ not to do so” due to the firm’s structure as a
partnership.79 KPMG announced in a form letter to its
employees that it would advance the legal fees but would limit
the amount it paid to up to $400,000 per individual and that
payment of the fees would be conditioned on that particular
employee being fully cooperative with the government and the
firm.80 The form letter also stated that if any of its employees
were charged with criminal wrongdoing, payment of legal
fees would cease immediately.81 After viewing the letter, the
USAO for the most part took no issue with the company’s
announcement and proceeded in its investigation.82
During the course of the investigation, when the AUSAs
felt that the company personnel they were investigating were
failing to adequately cooperate, the AUSAs would notify
KPMG.83 Counsel for the company would then inform the
attorneys for the individuals that legal fees would be
77
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 342 (emphasis added). One of the AUSAs
present at the initial meeting made a statement in reference to “federal guidelines”
that misconduct was not to be rewarded. Id. While intended by the AUSA as a
reference to federal sentencing guidelines, it was understood by counsel for KPMG as a
reference to the Thompson Memo, id. at 342 n.45, and “as a reminder that payment of
legal fees by KPMG, beyond any that it might legally be obligated to pay, could well
count against KPMG in the government’s decision whether to indict the firm,” id. at
344. The court also determined that another AUSA present at the meeting made a
comment that discretion regarding payment of legal fees would be looked at “under a
microscope,” even though the comment appeared only in the notes of one attorney for
KPMG, and no witness who testified at the hearing recalled the statement being made.
Id. at 344, 344 n.52.
78
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 408-09.
79
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344, 345; see also Browning, Prosecutor Denies
Pressure, supra note 67 (“Partnerships like KPMG typically pay an employees legal
fees. Nonetheless, KPMG had a choice.”).
80
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345; see also Mark Hamblett, Lawyers Spar over
KPMG Legal Defense Fee Policy, N.Y. L.J., May 9, 2006, at 1.
81
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345-46; Hamblett, supra note 80, at 1.
82
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 346; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 404
(referring to the government as “perfectly happy” to let KPMG advance the fees subject
to those conditions).
83
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347.

1128

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:3

terminated absent indication from the government that the
employees in question ceased in their refusal to participate in
government interviews.84 In some cases, the individuals
relented under the pressure from KPMG’s threats and
participated in the interviews.85 For those who refused, KPMG
terminated their employment and cut off payment of their
fees.86
Subsequent meetings between the government and
counsel for KPMG revealed the severance packages that had
been granted to certain executives, including the one provided
for Mr. Stein.87 The Stein agreement became a particularly
thorny issue88 for both sides for two reasons. First, the agreement had no real restrictions or conditions on the payment of
legal fees, which was inconsistent with KPMG’s earlier
statements to the government with regard to limitations it
would impose on such payments to current employees under
investigation.89 Second, the amount that KPMG spent on Mr.
Stein’s defense—over $640,000 for the criminal investigation
alone—clearly exceeded any amount KPMG had represented to
the AUSAs that it would pay in legal fees for employees.90
Despite the cooperation KPMG had shown with respect to its
remaining employees who were subject to investigation, the
government’s discontent with such rich severance packages
and the risk that it would be perceived as a failure to cooperate
greatly concerned KPMG.91 In May 2005, the company severed
the consulting agreement with Stein and cut off payment of his
legal fees in an effort to display full cooperation with the
government under the guidelines of the Thompson Memo.92
84

Id.
Id.; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 404 (stating that by allowing
KPMG to advance legal fees to its employee-defendants in the pre-indictment
investigation stage, but subject to conditions of full cooperation, the government
obtained leverage over the defendants through KPMG by “hold[ing] over their head
their job”).
86
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347.
87
Id.
88
Id. at 347-48. The agreement KPMG negotiated with Mr. Smith did not
raise an issue with the AUSAs because KPMG refused to effectuate it once it sensed
the pressure from the government. See Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 409.
89
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 347-48.
90
Id. at 348, nn.74, 80.
91
Id. at 347. The chief of the criminal division of the United States Attorney’s
Office, relayed to KPMG counsel and executives that such severance packages are a
“troubling issue under the ‘Thompson Memo,’” id. 344 n.51, which led to the firm
viewing the severance agreements as a “ticking bomb,” id. at 347.
92
Id. at 348; see also Browning, Tactic Questioned, supra note 16.
85
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In late August 2005, the first nine indictments of
individual KPMG employees, including that of Jeffrey Stein,
were handed down by a federal grand jury.93 As per the terms
of advancement that it had disclosed to the USAO, the
company ceased payments of legal fees for the indicted
defendants.94 Around that same period, KPMG and the
government entered into a Deferred Prosecution Agreement
(“DPA”).95 Among the terms of the DPA were that KPMG would
pay $456 million in penalties, would forego the indictment
process and be charged with one count of conspiracy to defraud
the government, and would admit to criminal wrongdoing.96 In
exchange, the government would not prosecute the company,
contingent on KPMG’s continued cooperation with the government’s investigation in accordance with the requirements of
the DPA and the acceptance of certain restrictions on its tax
practice.97 Shortly thereafter, in January 2006, the KPMG
defendants challenged the actions of the AUSAs authorized by
the Thompson Memo, claiming, among other things, that the
government interfered with their Sixth Amendment right to
93
Jonathan Weil, Nine Are Charged in KPMG Case on Tax Shelters, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 30, 2005, at C1. The indictments also named former senior tax chiefs
Richard Smith and John Lanning, as well as Raymond Ruble, a former partner at the
New York office of the law firm Sidley Austin Brown & Wood LLP, for his part in
writing legal opinions supporting the tax shelters. Id. The indictments also disclosed
allegations that “at least 14 KPMG partners used some of the shelters in question to
shave their own tax bills.” Id. In all, sixteen indictments were handed down by May
2006, a little over a month before the Stein I decision. See Browning, Prosecutor Denies
Pressure, supra note 67 (referring to the “tax shelter trial of 16 former employees of the
accounting firm KPMG”).
94
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
95
Weil, supra note 93.
96
Id. The DPA between KPMG and the government has been reported as a
victory for the company because it “gives the firm a chance to avoid the kind of criminal
case that proved fatal for . . . Arthur Andersen.” Jonathan D. Glater, KPMG’s Gain,
Partners’ Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2005, at C1; see also supra note 74 and
accompanying text.
97
Weil, supra note 93; see also Jonathan D. Glater, U.S. to Widen Inquiry of
KPMG Tax Shelters, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2005, at C1. The terms of this continued
cooperation required KPMG to promptly provide “all documents, records, information
and [any] other evidence” that the USAO, the IRS, or any other government agency
designated by the USAO would need for its continued investigation. Stein I, 435 F.
Supp. 2d at 349. In addition, KPMG agreed not to assert any claim of privilege
“including, but not limited to the attorney-client privilege and the work product
protection” in regards to any of the documents, records and other information
requested by the government. Id. at 349-50. Finally, under the DPA, KPMG agreed
that even after the dismissal of the Information, which contained the one charge
against the company in place of a formal indictment, KPMG would “continue to fulfill
the cooperation obligations set forth” in relation to any investigation, prosecution or
proceeding (criminal or civil) that arose out of the conduct being investigated. Id. at
350.
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the assistance of counsel by hindering KPMG’s advancement of
attorneys’ fees.98 In addition, the defendants requested that the
charges against them be dismissed.99 The District Court heard
the defendants’ challenge and ruled in their favor, holding that
the conduct of the AUSAs under the Thompson Memo did in
fact infringe on the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right.100
III.

OVERVIEW OF THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AND ITS APPLICATION IN STEIN

The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution
reads: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to . . . have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”101
While the assistance of counsel as a right in the United States
traces its roots at least to the earliest days of the American
Constitution,102 most of the modern interpretation and
application of the right to counsel has only taken place in the
last seventy-five years.103 It is as a result of this modern
interpretation that the court in Stein expressed the need to
protect this right of the KPMG defendants.
A.

The Right to Counsel and the Development of the
Modern Application

The right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment represents a deviation from the standard practice at the
time of the American Revolution.104 “Under English law, an
accused had a right to have counsel in misdemeanor, but not

98

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
Id.
100
Browning, Tactic Questioned, supra note 16. The government’s activity
“interfered with the ability of the KPMG Defendants to obtain resources they otherwise
would have had . . . [which] almost certainly will affect what these defendants can
afford to permit their counsel to do.” Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362. This in turn
infringed on “the rights of such employees to a fair trial and to the effective assistance
of counsel and therefore violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution.”
Id. at 382.
101
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
102
BEANEY, supra note 31, at 14-15 (stating that there is an ongoing debate
over the extent of the influence of English common law on the right to counsel as it
pertains to the pre- and post-Revolutionary period).
103
CHEATHAM, supra note 31, at 8-9 (listing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932), and Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), as “the two leading cases that
established the legal right to counsel” under the U.S. Constitution).
104
STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: CASES AND COMMENTARY 839 (7th ed. 2004).
99
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felony, cases.”105 Following the American Revolution, and upon
adoption of the Constitution, only one of the original thirteen
states continued to follow this practice.106 The remaining twelve
states “fully recognized the right to counsel in criminal
prosecutions.”107 However, the extent to which the individual
states observed the right to counsel in state prosecutions was
determined exclusively by state law and therefore could vary
greatly between states.108 The right to counsel guaranteed
under the Sixth Amendment also did not immediately apply to
the states, but rather applied only in federal prosecutions.109
The modern interpretation of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel began in 1932, with the Supreme Court’s
decision in Powell v. Alabama.110 The Powell Court determined
that the state of Alabama’s failure to ensure proper counsel for
defendants in a murder prosecution deprived the defendants of
their Due Process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.111
The Court also outlined the essential protections that the
assistance of counsel provides defendants:112
[N]otice and hearing are preliminary steps essential to the passing
of an enforceable judgment, and . . . constitute basic elements
of the constitutional requirement of due process of law . . . .
Historically . . ., in our country at least, [a hearing] has always
included the right to the aid of counsel when desired and provided by
the party asserting the right. The right to be heard would be . . . of
little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by
counsel.113

105

Id. While the English Parliament “granted special treatment to those
accused under the Treason Act of 1695, and required the court to appoint counsel upon
the request of the accused,” defendants were not permitted to have counsel in ordinary
felony cases in England until 1836. Id. (citing Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 821-26
(1975)).
106
Id.
107
Id. (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-64 (1932), where Justice
Sutherland noted that the new states embraced the right to counsel in their state
constitutions although the extent of such acceptance did vary from one state to the
next).
108
Id. at 840.
109
Id.
110
CHEATHAM, supra note 31, at 8; Danton Asher Berube, Drug Proceeds
Forfeiture and the Right to Counsel of Choice, 43 VAND. L. REV., 1377, 1378 (1990).
111
Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
112
Id. However the Court’s decision should not be construed as incorporating
Sixth Amendment protections to state criminal prosecutions through the Due Process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This was clearly stated by the Supreme Court
only ten years after Powell in Betts v. Brady. See 316 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1942).
113
Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
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Notably, the Court detailed the immense complexities of
the criminal process that make the protection of the right to
counsel so vital for criminal defendants:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with a crime, he is
incapable . . . of determining for himself whether the indictment is
good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without
the aid of counsel, he may be put on trial without a proper charge,
and convicted upon incompetent evidence . . . . He lacks both the
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though
he have a perfect one. He requires . . . counsel at every step in the
proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he
faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to
establish his innocence. If that be true of men of intelligence, how
much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those of feeble
intellect.114

Since its decision in Powell, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly asserted that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
is designed to guarantee a criminal defendant a fair trial in the
adversarial criminal process.115 “The Constitution guarantees a
fair trial through the Due Process Clauses, but it defines the
basic elements of a fair trial largely through the several
provisions of the Sixth Amendment, including the Counsel
Clause.”116 In its cases following Powell, the Court has further
fleshed out the nature of the rights encompassed by the right to
counsel. Most notably, in Gideon v. Wainwright, the Court
ruled that the protections of the right to counsel are a
“fundamental [safeguard] of liberty immune from federal
abridgment [and are] equally protected against state invasion
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”117
114
Id. at 68-69. Since Powell, courts have gone to great lengths to ensure that
proper representation has been provided, even going so far as to force the defendant to
accept counsel he wished to refuse when the defendant’s ability to represent himself
was in question. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) (holding that a State
may not constitutionally force a lawyer upon a criminal defendant who “voluntarily
and intelligently” chooses to proceed without counsel).
115
See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 31 (1972) (“The assistance of
counsel is often a requisite to the very existence of a fair trial.”); Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is in ours.”);
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States v. Morrison, 449
U.S. 361 (1981).
116
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684-85.
117
Gideon, 372 U.S. at 341, 342. This decision also expressly overturned the
Court’s holding in Betts v. Brady that the Sixth Amendment did not apply to states
through the incorporation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process. Id. at 345. See
supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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This decision made the appointment of counsel for defendants
unable to obtain counsel on their own an affirmative obligation
of both federal and state courts.118
Since its monumental holding delivered in Gideon, the
Supreme Court has continued to expound on the extent to
which the right to counsel applies. The Court’s assessments
have addressed the right as it pertains to, among other things:
the different stages of court proceedings at which the right to
counsel attaches,119 the different types and severity of
offenses,120 issues of self-representation,121 the requirement of
effective counsel,122 and defendants’ right to spend their own
money to obtain their counsel of choice.123
B.

The Sixth Amendment Protections at Issue in Stein

While the court in Stein applied this modern interpretation to a number of questions presented before it, for the
purposes of this Note, only two of these applications—
the requirement of effective counsel and the defendants’ right
to spend their own money on counsel of their choice—are of
significant importance.124
118

Gideon, 372 U.S. at 340, 344, 345.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding that certain pre-trial
proceedings such as suspect line-ups for witness identification are “critical
confrontations of the accused by the prosecution,” and that the presence of counsel is
“necessary to ensure a meaningful defense.”).
120
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 33 (1972). This case was critical in its
interpretation of the right to counsel for two reasons. First, it held that coverage
applies regardless of a crime’s classification as a felony or misdemeanor and regardless
of the severity of the punishment for the crime (i.e., fine or imprisonment). Id at 33.
Second, the Court took special notice of the difficulties that can arise when defendants
attempt to cooperate with government prosecutors:
119

Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea, a problem
which looms large in misdemeanor as well as felony cases. Counsel is needed
so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully
aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly
by the prosecution.
Id.
121
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. at 807 (holding that even though defendants
have a right to counsel, and despite the Sixth Amendment’s purpose to ensure a fair
trial, the State may not force a defendant to accept the assistance of counsel when that
defendant insists on conducting his own defense); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942) (holding that the Constitution does not force a lawyer on
the individual).
122
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970).
123
See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 10 (1983).
124
The court in Stein I acknowledged that “[t]he Sixth Amendment attaches
only upon indictment.” Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 373 (S.D.N.Y 2006). However, as
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1. The Right to Effective Assistance
The first application of the Sixth Amendment in Stein I
was the court’s suggestion that the KPMG defendants were
deprived of the right to the effective assistance of counsel.125 In
McMann v. Richardson, the Supreme Court stated unequivocally that the right to counsel means the entitlement to
“the effective assistance of competent counsel.”126 While this
entitlement was put forth by the Court as early as its decision
in Powell,127 it is the Court’s decision in McMann which
clarified that the Sixth Amendment contained an implicit right
to effective counsel.128 “[I]f the right to counsel . . . is to serve
its purpose, defendants cannot be left to the mercies of
incompetent counsel.”129
There has been extensive debate both within130 and
outside131 of the courts regarding what constitutes effective
versus ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court
has addressed claims of ineffective assistance pertaining to
both the general incompetence of the attorney, as well as
government interference with the defendant’s efforts to mount
a defense.132 While the Stein court stressed that the defendants
were deprived of their rights to counsel “irrespective of the
the court also found that the government’s pre-indictment actions were likely to have
“an unconstitutional effect upon indictment,” this warranted a finding of attachment of
Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 366. Since the court’s decision regarding the
attachment of the right has no bearing on the purpose of this Note, it does not warrant
further discussion.
125
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
126
397 U.S. at 771.
127
“[S]uch designation of counsel as was attempted was either so indefinite or
so close upon the trial as to amount to a denial of effective and substantial aid in that
regard.” Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. at 45, 53 (1932). Having found that the counsel
for the defendants had made no investigation because no opportunity to do so had been
given, the Court held that the “defendants were not accorded the right of counsel in
any substantial sense.” Id. at 58. “[T]he necessity of counsel was so vital and
imperative that the failure of the trial court to make an effective appointment of
counsel was likewise a denial of due process . . . .” Id. at 71.
128
JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY M. BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL, § 1.1 (summarizing the history of the right to effective assistance of counsel).
129
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1969).
130
See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); United States
v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980); Herring v. New
York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975).
131
See BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 128, at § 1:1; see, e.g., Kathleen M.
Golden, The Sequestration of Criminal Defendants: A Proposal For the Use of Harmless
Error Analysis in the Aftermath of Geders v. United States, 52 ALB. L. REV. 243, 246
(1988) (discussing the impact of sequestering criminal defendants during trial on their
right to effective assistance of counsel).
132
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
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quality of representation they receive” due to the effects of the
government’s interference, it also hinted at the potential risk of
incompetent counsel.133
a. Incompetent Counsel
The influence of the Thompson Memo and the conduct of
the AUSAs created a risk of rendering private counsel for the
KPMG defendants incompetent. In Strickland v. Washington,
the Supreme Court developed a two-pronged test to evaluate
a convicted defendant’s claim of defective assistance.134 First,
there must be a showing of deficient representation by proving
that counsel made errors so grave that he or she was not
functioning as counsel within the scope of the Sixth
Amendment right.135 Second, the defendant must show that
this deficiency prejudiced his or her defense, depriving that
defendant of a fair trial.136 The quality of representation by
the defendant’s counsel must fall “below an objective standard
of reasonableness.”137 Among the factors to consider in
determining whether either of these prongs has been met are
the attorney’s failure to maintain a duty of loyalty to the client
by avoiding conflicts of interest, failure to advocate the
defendant’s cause, failure to consult with the defendant on
important decisions, and failure to keep the defendant
informed of important developments in the course of the
prosecution.138 The inquiry looks at the totality of the
circumstances to determine the reasonableness of counsel’s
performance.139
The Supreme Court specifically addressed conflicts of
interest in Cuyler v. Sullivan.140 In Cuyler, the Court ruled that

133

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 369-70, 382 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
135
Id.; see also infra notes 153-155 and accompanying text.
136
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
137
Id. at 688; see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 128, at § 1:2 n.4
(citing critics of Strickland who believe that the test is geared more towards judicial
efficiency in adjudicating such claims, as opposed to removal of injustices caused by
incompetent trial counsel).
138
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.
139
Id.
140
446 U.S. 335 (1980); see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 128, ch. 3
(providing a ranging overview of different factors to be considered by courts hearing
claims of ineffective counsel due to attorney conflicts of interest, including claims
raised before and after trial, obligations of trial courts to identify and inquire into
potential conflicts, and harmonization with ethical standards for attorneys).
134
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a defendant is denied the right to effective assistance when
counsel for the defendant has a conflict of interest which
prejudices the defense.141 The Court also ruled that a defendant
is entitled to the same measure of effectiveness when he or she
employs retained counsel as when counsel is appointed by the
court: “The vital guarantee of the Sixth Amendment would
stand for little if the often uninformed decision to retain a
particular lawyer could reduce or forfeit the defendant’s
entitlement to constitutional protection.”142
In Stein I, though ineffectiveness based on a prejudicial
conflict of interest of retained counsel was not explicitly found,
the possibility was certainly raised.143 The court analyzed the
pressure placed by the AUSAs on KPMG to limit its assistance
in the form of advancing legal fees to its employees:
[T]he government [did not] question the obvious conflict of interest
manifest in [counsel for KPMG]’s offer to recommend as counsel to
targeted KPMG employees “law firms that were familiar with these
types of proceedings and who understood that cooperation with the
government was the best way for KPMG to proceed.”144

The conflict of interest in Stein stemmed from KPMG’s
conditioning and limiting of fee payment to counsel for its
targeted employees. This created a risk that attorneys for the
KPMG employees might not provide full assistance based on
the perceived need to avoid risking a criminal indictment
against their clients resulting in the termination of payment of
their fees and the need to cooperate with the government in
order not to risk an indictment of the company.145 However, as
141
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350; see also Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 167-68
(2002) (distinguishing between conflict of interest cases warranting an automatic
reversal of any conviction when defense counsel objects to representing divergent
interests, and cases requiring defendants to establish prejudice to the defense where
the conflict is not objected to, and the trial court does not know of, nor reasonably
should know of the conflict, prompting an inquiry).
142
Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 344. The Court also held that, despite the private
relationship between a criminal defendant and his retained counsel, since a state
criminal proceeding is an action of the state, the mere obtaining of a conviction in a
trial where the defendant is inadequately represented constitutes the necessary state
action to give rise to a due process violation. Id. at 343; see also BURKOFF & BURKOFF,
supra note 128, at § 1:8.
143
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 345 n.54, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
144
Id. at 345 n.54; see also Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 347 (requiring trial courts to
initiate inquiries into conflicts of interest where the court “knows or reasonably should
know that a particular conflict exists”).
145
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 344-46; see also Berube, supra note 110, at 1395
(discussing similar conflicts of interest arising in criminal cases where defendants’
assets, including attorneys’ fees, may be forfeited prior to trial).
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any risk of ineffective counsel was created by the government’s
actions and the influence of the Thompson Memo, the Stein
court did not focus on incompetence of counsel, but rather
analyzed the case in terms of government interference. In
addition, for the reasons discussed below, the Stein I court
did not require a showing of prejudice to the defense.
Regardless, it is important to highlight how a conflict of
interest risks rendering defense counsel incompetent as a
potential byproduct of excessive government scrutiny over how
white collar defendants retain and pay for their representation.
b. Claims of Ineffective Assistance Based on
Government Interference
Government interference with the ability of counsel to
make “independent decisions about how to conduct the defense”
also constitutes a violation of a criminal defendant’s right to
the effective assistance of counsel.146
More specifically, the right to the assistance of counsel has been
understood to mean that there can be no restrictions upon the
function of counsel in defending a criminal prosecution in accord
with the traditions of the adversary fact-finding process that has
been constitutionalized in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.147

Examples of government interference that have been found to
render counsel’s assistance ineffective include state statutes
permitting judges the discretion to bar closing summations in
non-jury trials,148 court orders denying defendants the right to
speak with their counsel,149 state rules requiring a defendant to
testify first or not at all,150 and state rules declaring defendants
unfit to testify under oath at trial on their own behalf.151
146

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 857 (1975).
148
Id. at 864 (discussing the different arguments that the defendant’s
attorney might have made during closing arguments, potentially altering the ultimate
judgment rendered in the case).
149
Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88 (1975) (discussing the importance
of allowing defense counsel to speak with the defendant during an overnight recess in a
criminal trial due to “tactical decisions to be made and strategies to be reviewed”).
150
Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1972) (“By requiring the
accused and his lawyer to make [the choice to testify first or not at all] without an
opportunity to evaluate the actual worth of their evidence, the statute restricts the
defense—particularly counsel—in the planning of the case.”).
151
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 592-94, 596 (1961) (holding that
allowing a defendant to make only an unsworn statement during trial and preventing
defense counsel from conducting a direct examination of the defendant denied the
defendant of his rights to counsel and due process).
147
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In Stein I, the court found a violation of the defendants’
right to counsel based on the Thompson Memo and the AUSAs’
scrutiny of KPMG’s fee advancement policy. The court held
that the government obstructed the employees’ access to a valid
source of funding for their legal defense and therefore
improperly intruded on the manner in which the individual
employees wished to defend themselves.152 In arriving at its
holding, the court took notice of the immense amount of time,
document review, and complexity involved in the preparation of
what the court recognized was at least one of the “largest tax
fraud case[s] in United States history.”153 This also warranted
consideration of the vast amount of money that would be
needed in order for the defendants to mount the defense they
desired.154 The court in Stein I and again in Stein III
highlighted the potential risks ensuing from such an
obstruction, pointing out that “[a]t least most of [the
defendants] likely will be unable to afford to pay their
attorneys to review all or even most of the documents the
government has produced or . . . to interview even a fraction of
the witnesses the government has interviewed.”155 The court in

152
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362. “The government here acted with the
purpose of minimizing these defendants’ access to resources necessary to mount their
defenses or, at least, in reckless disregard that this would be the likely result of its
actions. In these circumstances, it is not unfair to hold it accountable.” Id. at 366-67.
153
Id. at 362; see also Lynnley Browning, Judge Delays KPMG Tax Trial Over
Legal Fees Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2006, at C3. In its decision in Stein III, the
court again raised this issue, pointing out the significant increases in the amount of
documentation produced since its decision in Stein I, obstacles arising in accessing the
documents, numerous motions raised over the course of the investigation, and the
expected length of the trial. Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 417-18 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
154
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362 n.163, 371; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at
423-24.
155
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 423
(stating that the relatively small net worth of some of the defendants in the case,
compared with the large amounts already owed to their attorneys, illustrates that
“[n]one of them can afford to defend this case at any meaningful level”). These
considerations seem to indicate concern on the part of the Stein court that the
defendants might not be effectively represented within the minimum requirements of
the Sixth Amendment, discussed supra Part III.B.1.a, due to the need for counsel to
make “strategic choices . . . after thorough investigation of law and facts.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 690. However, two determinations by the court in Stein I and III remove
this point from consideration. First, the Stein I court found that the defendants were
deprived of their rights to counsel “irrespective of the quality of representation they
receive[d].” Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 369. Second, the Stein III court recognized that
appointed counsel, which would statutorily receive dramatically lower fees and would
likely be more restricted in its ability to investigate, could still potentially “provide the
minimally effective defense” required by the Constitution. Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at
421. Therefore, this particular Sixth Amendment concern does not warrant speculation
in this Note.
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Stein I also addressed the costs of tax experts that would likely
be needed to rebut expert testimony presented by the
government.156
However, the KPMG defendants were not required to
prove that their defense had been prejudiced, as is customary
for a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel.157 The Stein I
court ruled that the government’s conduct that interfered with
the defendants’ right “to be represented as they choose”
constituted a complete deprivation of their right to counsel
without it hinging on the quality of the representation they
received.158 Thus, before any criminal trial could even begin, the
court had to determine whether corrective action could allow
the defendants to defend themselves as they had wished,
guaranteeing them their right to a fair trial.159
Additionally, prejudice is not required where the
governmental interference is severe enough that it creates
an overarching structural defect in a defendant’s trial.160 Such
a defect could prohibit even fully competent counsel from
providing effective assistance,161 and would warrant a presumption of prejudice against the defendant.162 In Stein I, the court
found that such a defect existed in violation of the defendants’
right to counsel as a direct result of the Thompson Memo and
the actions of the AUSAs.163 The court expressly held that the
government’s obstruction of the defendants’ access to funds
created a very high risk of contaminating the entire proceeding
and that due to the immense amount of documentation
involved, the substantial time and cost expended, and the
complexity of the case, it would be impossible to know whether
the defendants could have altered the outcome absent the
limitations imposed by the government.164 Thus, a presumption
of prejudice was warranted without need to review specific

156

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
Id. at 369.
158
Id.
159
Id.
160
See United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2564-65 (2006)
(citing Arizona v. Fulimante, 499 U.S. 279, 306-10 (1991)) (dividing constitutional
errors into “trial errors,” which occur during presentation of the case to the jury and
are subject to harmless-error review, and “structural defects,” which affect the
framework of the entire trial).
161
Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. at 2563-64.
162
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984).
163
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
164
Id. at 371-72.
157
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details of any ensuing trial.165 This entitled the defendant
employees to relief to the extent that “the Thompson
Memorandum and the activities of the USAO . . . interfered
with the rights of such employees to a fair trial and to the
effective assistance of counsel.”166
2. The Defendants’ Right to Spend Their Own Money
on Counsel of Their Choice
The second application of the right to counsel in the
Stein cases is the district court’s holding in Stein III that the
defendants were improperly deprived of their right to counsel
of their choice.167 The right of defendants to obtain the counsel
of their choice is another application of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel that has been recognized since Powell.168
However, the extent to which a defendant may choose his or
her own counsel has been circumscribed by the restriction that
the defendant be able to afford that counsel.169 This limitation
was made clear by the Supreme Court in Morris v. Slappy.170
In Morris, the Court was presented with an indigent
defendant who was represented by an appointed attorney,
which the trial court had replaced due to illness.171 The
defendant argued for a continuance, over the objections of his
165

However, the Supreme Court has also held that the mere need to review
large amounts of documentation, complexity of the case, and time constraints in
preparing an adequate defense do not give rise to an automatic finding of ineffective
representation by counsel. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1984)
(holding that representation of a criminal defendant by an appointed attorney who
had only twenty-five days to prepare a defense in a fraud case involving review of
thousands of documents, and where the government had over four and a half years to
investigate and prepare, does not create an automatic presumption of ineffectiveness).
This would still require the accused to show specific errors made by his counsel that
“undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt,” Id. at 659 n.26, without which
reversal would be required even when counsel’s actual representation was flawless. Id.
at 653. However such factors are relevant considerations in determining whether
counsel made errors prejudicial to the defendant in his particular case and the extent
to which those errors and prejudice rendered counsel ineffective. Id. at 663; see also
United States v. Cronic, 839 F.2d 1401, 1402-04 (10th Cir. 1988) (finding, on remand
from the Supreme Court, that errors made by counsel during trial due to inadequate
preparation time and counsel’s inexperience caused prejudicial error to the defendant
warranting a finding of ineffectiveness).
166
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
167
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
168
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to say
that the right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice.”).
169
See Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-15 (1983).
170
Id.
171
Id. at 5.
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second attorney, claiming that his new counsel did not have
enough time to prepare an adequate defense.172 The trial court
denied the defendant’s motion, and the defendant was subsequently convicted.173 On appeal, the Circuit Court found that
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was violated due to the
absence of a “meaningful attorney-client relationship” with his
appointed counsel.174 The Supreme Court rejected the ruling by
the Circuit Court, holding that where a defendant is unable to
afford counsel of his choice, the Sixth Amendment does not
require the defendant have a meaningful relationship with his
appointed counsel.175
Even when a defendant has sufficient assets to retain
counsel of his choosing, further limitations on the guarantee
may apply. In Wheat v. United States,176 the Supreme Court
evaluated a potential conflict of interest when the defendant’s
desired counsel was disqualified by the trial court due to
already representing other defendants charged in the same
conspiracy.177 The attorney had already been involved in
substantial contact with the prosecution, and the government
was concerned that if one of the other defendants were to
testify against the petitioner, the attorney would fail in his
responsibility to provide effective counsel.178 The Court ruled
that the trial court did not err in its disqualification of the
defendant’s counsel of choice and the defendant’s conviction
was upheld.179 The court made it clear that
[t]he Sixth Amendment right to choose one’s own counsel is
circumscribed in several important respects. . . . [A] defendant may
not insist on representation by an attorney he cannot afford, or who
for other reasons declines to represent the defendant. Nor may a
defendant insist on the counsel of an attorney who has a previous or

172

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6-7, 9.
174
Id. at 10.
175
Id. at 13 (“No court could possibly guarantee that a defendant will develop
the kind of rapport with his attorney—privately retained or provided by the public—
that the Court of Appeals thought part of the Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel.”).
176
486 U.S. 153 (1988).
177
Id. at 157.
178
Id. at 155.
179
Id. The Court also weighed the risk of government abuse in manufacturing
conflicts to prevent defendants from being represented by “able defense counsel,” but
chose to rely on trial courts being aware of such a tactic. Id. at 163.
173
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ongoing relationship with an opposing party, even when the
opposing party is the Government.180

Where a defendant is wrongfully denied his counsel of
choice, such a deprivation is also a complete violation of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and a defendant might not
be required to show prejudice to his defense.181 In United States
v. Gonzalez-Lopez, the Supreme Court stated that “the right to
select counsel of one’s choice . . . has never been derived from
the Sixth Amendment’s purpose of ensuring a fair trial,” but
rather is “regarded as the root meaning of the constitutional
guarantee.”182 Thus, erroneous deprivations of counsel of choice
may constitute structural errors which pervade the entire trial,
removing any requirement to show prejudice.
To determine the effect of wrongful denial of choice of counsel [is not
to look] for mistakes committed by the actual counsel, but for
differences in the defense that would have been made by the rejected
counsel . . . . We would have to speculate upon what matters the
rejected counsel would have handled differently . . . . [a]nd then
we would have to speculate upon what effect those different choices
had or different intangibles might have had. The difficulties of
conducting [assessments of prejudice for wrongful denial of counsel
of choice and ineffective assistance of counsel] are not remotely
comparable.183

The court’s holding in Stein III came after it noted that
at least some of the defendants had retained multiple counsel
prior to being indicted but were forced to terminate some of
their counsel when KPMG cut off payments for their legal
fees.184 However, the right to counsel of choice was implicated
even prior to the district court’s affirmative holding in Stein III
180
Wheat, 486 U.S. at 159. “The right to counsel of choice . . . is not absolute.
When a defendant’s selection of counsel, under the particular . . . circumstances of a
case, gravely imperils the prospect of a fair trial, a court may justifiably refuse to
accede to the choice. Thus a trial court may in certain situations reject a defendant’s
choice of counsel on the ground of a potential conflict of interest, because a serious
conflict may indeed destroy the integrity of the trial process.” Id. at 166 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); see also Lainfiesta v. Artuz, 253 F.3d 151, 154 (2d Cir. 2001) (stating that
the right may be overcome if it is “outweighed by competing interests in the fair
administration of justice or maintaining orderly trial procedures”).
181
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 126 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (2006).
182
Id. at 2563.
183
Id. at 2565. But see also Lainfiesta, 253 F.3d at 157 (holding, where a trial
court limited cross-examination of witnesses to only one of defendant’s two attorneys,
that such a denial may not warrant automatic reversal since it does not constitute an
“[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
184
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
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when the Stein I court dismissed the government’s claim that
the Sixth Amendment did not entitle the KPMG defendants to
spend “‘other people’s money’ on expensive defense counsel.”185
The linchpin of the government’s argument against protection
of the individual defendants’ use of other people’s money186—in
this case KPMG’s—was the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States,187 and United
States v. Monsanto.188 In Caplin and Monsanto, the Court
addressed whether a federal statute allowing the government
to seek a restraining order prohibiting the transfer of a
defendant’s assets that were potentially forfeitable to the
government as fruits of a violation of federal drug laws
infringed on that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of his choice.189 The Court held both in Caplin and
Monsanto that no Sixth Amendment violation occurred since
the statute only prohibited the use of forfeitable assets to
obtain one’s counsel of choice.190
Nevertheless, the Stein I court rejected the government’s reliance on these cases as relevant precedent for such
an argument.191 First, the court pointed out that Caplin and
Monsanto dealt with a defendant who sought to spend money
that, being forfeitable under federal law, belonged to the
government.192 Second, it interpreted Caplin as standing for the
185

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d 330, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id.; see also Bloomberg News, supra note 60 (reporting on the federal
prosecutors argument that “[t]he constitution only guarantees defendants the right to a
lawyer, ‘not the best lawyer money can buy or a particular lawyer’”).
187
491 U.S. 617 (1989).
188
491 U.S. 600 (1989).
189
Caplin, 491 U.S. at 623-24; Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614.
190
Caplin, 491 U.S. at 625. “A defendant has no Sixth Amendment right to
spend another person’s money for services rendered by an attorney, even if those funds
are the only way that that defendant will be able to retain the attorney of his
choice . . . . [when t]he money, though in his possession, is not rightfully his . . . .” Id. at
626. Caplin and Monsanto were companion cases that were handed down by the
Supreme Court on the same day. Consequently, the Court relied on its decision in
Caplin to answer the same question in Monsanto. Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 614.
191
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
192
Id. at 367. In Caplin, the Supreme Court also compared defendant’s use of
funds obtained through federal drug violations for payment of legal fees to that of a
defendant wishing to use the proceeds of a bank robbery for the same purpose. 491 U.S.
at 626. However the comparison between the government’s interest in forfeited assets
due to a drug transaction, and its interest in assets resulting from a bank robbery has
been criticized by commentators. See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees
Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma
and How to Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 765, 814 (1989) (claiming that the bank
analogy fails because the assets are the rightful property of the bank, and must be
returned). However, the purpose of the analogy in Caplin was to show that whether the
186
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proposition that the Sixth Amendment protects “a defendant’s
right to spend his own money on a defense”193 and that the
expectation of the KPMG employees that KPMG would cover
their legal expenses arising out of any claims or charges based
on their service with the firm was a property right that could
not be interfered with by the government.194 The court went on
to hold in Stein III that even though many of these defendants
still retained their own counsel for their defense after KPMG
had cut off legal fees, the right to counsel of choice “includes
the right to a second lawyer or law firm if the defendant can
afford it, either from his own resources or from those lawfully
available to him from others.”195
C.

The Remedy Granted to the KPMG Defendants for
Violation of Their Constitutional Rights and Its
Impact on the Prosecution

After determining that the KPMG defendants’ Sixth
Amendment rights had been violated, the court in Stein I and
Stein III considered the appropriate remedy. In Stein I,
the court did not grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss
the indictments against the employees.196 Rather, it gave the
defendants limited relief “tailored narrowly to the injury
suffered”197 by suppressing certain statements made by the
defendants that the government obtained as a result of its
constitutional violations.198 However, the court did reserve
the ability to make a decision regarding “whether to grant
additional relief,”199 including the option to dismiss the
indictments at a later time.200

forfeitable assets are obtained by the defendant from a legally possessing third party
(i.e., the bank), or obtained by the defendant without intruding on a legitimate third
party claim (i.e., in drug cases), the fact that the assets are “tainted” by the illegal
acquisition is what vests the government with its property interest through forfeiture.
Caplin, 491 U.S. at 627.
193
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
194
Id.
195
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
196
Browning, Tactic Questioned, supra note 16.
197
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
198
Stein III, 440 F. Supp. 2d 315, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
199
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 382.
200
See Lynnley Browning, Judge Raises New Concerns About Tactics In
Shelter Case, N.Y. TIMES, July, 14, 2006, at C3 [hereinafter Browning, Judge Raises]
(reporting that one month after Stein I the judge suggested “he might consider
postponing the trial or even dismissing the case”).
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In Stein III, the court reexamined appropriate relief for
the defendants after it was unable to force the government to
reimburse the legal fees to the individual defendants as a
result of the government’s sovereign immunity protection.201 In
addition, the defendant’s efforts to seek civil action against
KPMG to have their legal fees paid failed for lack of
jurisdiction.202 As a result, the court (albeit “with the greatest
reluctance”) dismissed the indictments of thirteen employee
defendants whose rights were violated due to KPMG’s discontinuing the payment of legal fees.203 However, it denied
dismissal to the remaining three defendants who were former
employees of the firm and who had not shown that KPMG
would have paid their defense costs “as a matter of either grace
or obligation.”204 In spite of this and as a result of its
overreaching, the government lost the opportunity to prosecute
many of the suspected individuals for their alleged criminal
misconduct.
IV.

THE DISTRICT COURT’S FACTUAL FINDINGS IN STEIN
AND ITS WEAKNESSES

Before concluding that the government intruded on the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel of the defendant employees,
the Stein court arrived at a number of factual conclusions in
order to ascertain whether the Sixth Amendment was even
implicated. First, the court determined that KPMG would have
advanced legal fees to its employees.205 This conclusion was
based partly on a state statute giving KPMG the option (but
not necessarily the obligation) to indemnify its employees
through means which include the advancement of legal fees206
as well as on evidence showing that KPMG had a history of
201

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
The court in Stein I had originally held that it had the requisite
jurisdiction over the defendants’ claims against KPMG for reimbursement and
advancement of their legal fees. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 379. However, this ruling
was overturned by the Second Circuit on appeal. See Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 486 F.3d
753, 756 (2d Cir. 2007).
203
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 423, 427.
204
Id. at 426-27.
205
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 405.
206
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 n.117 (citing the Delaware Revised Uniform
Partnership Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 15-110 (providing that, subject to the
partnership agreement, “a partnership may, and shall have the power to, indemnify
and hold harmless any partner or other person from and against any and all claims
and demands whatsoever”)).
202
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doing so.207 This finding was bolstered in Stein III by additional
evidence that the court felt revealed KPMG’s true desire to
cover litigation expenses for the indicted defendants.208 This
included the voicemail message from KPMG to its partners
offering to pay for counsel for any current or former members
of the firm involved in the investigation, the severance
agreement negotiated with Richard Smith that KPMG refused
to sign after it sensed the pressure from the AUSAs, and notes
taken by counsel for KPMG from the firm’s initial meeting with
the USAO.209
Next, the court concluded that the threat of an
indictment based on the guidelines in the Thompson Memo and
the pressure applied on KPMG by the AUSAs during the
course of the investigation caused the company to “consider
departing from its long-standing policy of paying legal fees and
expenses.”210 However in arriving at these conclusions, the
court was forced to make a number of circumstantial inferences
that illuminate the difficulties faced in making constitutional
determinations regarding the advancement of legal fees and
that illustrate the weaknesses of the Stein court’s decisions.
A.

The Court’s Holdings Regarding Indemnification and
Advancement

In assessing what legal obligation KPMG had to
advance legal fees to its employees, the Stein I court first
looked at whether the company was subject to state
indemnification laws.211 Aware that all states have laws
addressing company indemnification of employees and that
these laws differ in terms of whether indemnification is
207

As the Stein court wrote:

KPMG had an unbroken track record of paying the legal expenses of its
partners and employees incurred as a result of their jobs, without regard to
cost. All of the . . . defendants therefore had, at a minimum, every reason to
expect that KPMG would pay their legal expenses in connection with the
government’s investigation and, if they were indicted, defending against any
charges that arose out of their employment by KPMG.
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355-56; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 402, 406.
208
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 407.
209
Id. at 407-08.
210
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352 (also determining that KPMG had
considered departing from its practice of advancing fees, even before any conversations
with the AUSAs took place, based merely on the inherent threat of indictment posed in
the Thompson Memo); Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
211
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
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permissive or required, the court had to determine what
statutory obligations attached to KPMG.212 The court
recognized that these statutes differ not just between states
but also between different types of business entities within
the same state.213 Since KPMG is a Delaware company, the
court applied the indemnification laws of the state of
Delaware.214 Next, since KPMG was formed as a limited
liability partnership, the court distinguished between the
indemnification statutes governing Delaware corporations215
and statutes governing Delaware partnerships.216 Finally, the
court noted that the law governing individual defendants may
change when an individual is an employee rather than a
partner in the firm and works in a different state.217
This analysis illustrates three issues courts must
consider in evaluating a company’s statutory obligation to
indemnify its employees. First, the court must identify the
type of business entity employing the person subject to the
litigation and whether it is covered under a state’s indemnifi-

212

Id. at 354-55 (citing 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1344.10 (2002)).
213
Id. at 354. While indemnification laws vary between states, this Note will
focus on Delaware’s indemnification law, both for simplicity as well as due to KPMG’s
status as a Delaware Limited Liability Partnership.
214
Id. at 355 n.117.
215
Delaware law provides:
A corporation shall have power to indemnify any person who was or is a party
or is threatened to be made a party to any . . . pending or completed action,
suit or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative or investigative . . . by reason of the fact that the person is or was a director, officer,
employee or agent of the corporation . . . against expenses (including
attorneys’ fees), judgments, fines and amounts paid in settlement actually
and reasonably incurred by the person in connection with such action, suit or
proceeding if the person acted in good faith and in a manner the person
reasonably believed to be in . . . the best interests of the corporation, and,
with respect to any criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to
believe the person’s conduct was unlawful.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2006). Section 145(b) continues:
[N]o indemnification shall be made in respect of any claim . . . as to which
such person shall have been adjudged to be liable to the corporation
unless . . . the court . . . shall determine upon application that, despite the
adjudication of liability but in view of all the circumstances of the case, such
person is fairly and reasonably entitled to indemnity for such expenses which
the Court . . . shall deem proper.
Id. § 145(b).
216

Id. tit. 6, § 15-110; Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 n.117.
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 356 n.119 (discussing KPMG defendants
who were entitled to mandatory indemnification under California law).
217
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cation law.218 Second, the court must then ascertain what
classes of employees within the company (that is, officers,
directors, partners, employees, etc.) are intended to be covered
by the indemnification statute in question and whether a
specific employee falls within that class. Finally, depending on
those first two factors, the court must be sure that it is
applying the indemnification statute of the proper state. This
analysis becomes even more confusing when one realizes that,
as in Stein, the state statute may permit indemnification but
not require it.219
The Stein I court noted that the Delaware indemnification law is subject to any “standards and restrictions” set
out in KPMG’s partnership agreement.220 The court inferred
that since KPMG’s agreement contained no such restrictions,
rendering it “entirely free to indemnify its personnel,” KPMG
would have necessarily done so.221 However, this argument also
cuts the other way. KPMG’s statutory freedom to indemnify its
personnel does not necessarily create an obligation to do so.222
Depending on the state whose indemnification law is applied,
the statutory requirements, and the type of company in
question, a showing of good faith by the individual being
investigated may be required before he or she might be eligible
for indemnification.223
218
As a general example, the law in the state of Delaware governing
companies set up as corporations does not govern companies set up as limited liability
partnerships. See DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 145(a) (establishing permissive indemnification for Delaware corporations); id., tit. 6., § 15-110 (establishing permissive
indemnification for Delaware partnerships).
219
See Kurt A. Mayr, II, Note, Indemnification of Directors and Officers: The
Double Whammy of Mandatory Indemnification Under Delaware Law in Walutch v.
Conticommodity Services, Inc., 42 VILL. L. REV. 223, 223-24 (1997) (noting that, in
response to concerns regarding director and officer personal liability, states enacted
statutes to limit director and officer exposure through “indemnification statutes that
empower corporations to indemnify their directors and officers . . . and, in some
instances, requiring such indemnification” (emphasis added)).
220
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 n.117 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§ 15-110)).
221
Id.
222
Sr. Tour Players 207 Mgmt. Co. v. Golftown 207 Holding Co., 853 A.2d 124,
127 n.5 (Del. Ch. 2004) (comparing the nearly identical language under Delaware
limited liability company and limited partnership law, and stating that “[t]he statutory
language is permissive and does not per se create a right to indemnification”).
223
See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (requiring that the person seeking
indemnification act “in good faith and in a manner the person reasonably believed to be
in or not opposed to the best interests of the corporation, and, with respect to any
criminal action or proceeding, had no reasonable cause to believe the person’s conduct
was unlawful”); Julie J. Bisceglia, Practical Aspects of Directors’ and Officers’ Liability
Insurance—Allocating and Advancing Legal Fees and the Duty to Defend, 32 UCLA L.
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This exposes a weakness in the Stein court’s presumption that, absent the presence of the Thompson Memo, KPMG
would have paid the defense costs for its partners and
employees simply because it had the discretion to do so. With
nothing in KPMG’s partnership agreement making any
mention of indemnification,224 it is entirely possible that KPMG,
or any company subject to government investigation, may
choose to inquire as to whether an employee, partner, officer or
director’s acts were in good faith and perceived as lawful before
determining eligibility for indemnification.225 Additionally, as
noted by the Stein I court, virtually all indemnification laws
have one common characteristic: the right to indemnification is
contingent on the defense to the legal proceedings being
successful on the merits.226 Therefore, any obligation KPMG
had to indemnify would not exist if the individual defendants
were found guilty of the charges.

REV. 690, 696-97 (1985) (discussing how states have followed Delaware, permitting
indemnification for expenses, fines, and judgment and settlement costs where the
defendant acts in good faith and, in criminal actions, has no reasonable cause to believe
his conduct is illegal); see also J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN,
PARTNERSHIP LAW AND PRACTICE: GENERAL AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS § 10:6 (2007)
(stating that a requirement of good faith may be set as a standard for indemnification);
Sr. Tour Players, 853 A.2d at 128 (interpreting the operating agreement of a limited
liability company which expressly denied indemnification for actions involving bad
faith).
224
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 340.
225
Indeed, it appears that even in KPMG’s case, an argument that good faith
and perception of lawful conduct were absent could be made. See Weil, supra note 93,
at C1 (reporting that one former partner who was indicted testified before the Senate
Subcommittee regarding “his attempts to dissuade senior partners from approving one
of the four shelters in question. . . . Emails showed he cautioned other KPMG partners
that the strategy wasn’t legitimate”). This argument may be advanced even further by
considering that KPMG’s decision to terminate the employment of some of its senior
partners, see supra Part II.B, came even before its initial discussions with USAO.
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
226
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355 (citing Homestore Inc. v. Tafeen, 888 A.2d
204, 211 (Del. 2005) as stating that while Delaware’s law “allows corporate officials to
defend themselves in legal proceedings ‘secure in the knowledge that, if vindicated, the
corporation will bear the expense of litigation[,]’ . . . indemnification cannot be
established until after the defense to legal proceedings has been ‘successful on the
merits or otherwise’” (footnotes omitted)); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(c) (“To
the extent that a . . . director or officer of a corporation has been successful on the
merits . . . in defense of any action . . ., such person shall be indemnified against
expenses (including attorneys’ fees) actually and reasonably incurred . . . .”); CALLISON
& SULLIVAN, supra note 223 (suggesting “success on the merits” as a “method for
determining whether the standard for indemnification has been met” in the creation of
a partnership agreement); Majkowski v. Am. Imaging Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 913 A.2d
572, 586 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“[A]n indemnification dispute cannot be resolved until after
the merits of the underlying controversy are decided because the good faith standard
requires a factual inquiry in the events that gave rise to the lawsuit.”).
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Even assuming that indemnification does apply and
that the defense can succeed on the merits, individual
defendants in these types of criminal proceedings, without
more, might still be faced with the extreme difficulty of
covering the cost of the litigation.227 This exposes the
defendants to “the personal out-of-pocket financial burden of
paying the significant on-going expenses inevitably involved
with investigations and legal proceedings.”228 At least in part
out of these concerns, indemnification statutes generally allow
for the advancement of legal fees before the conclusion of the
case.229 One rationale for this is that advancement is needed as
an inducement to attract the most capable individuals to
positions of high responsibility in companies.230
However, a major drawback to indemnification statutes
that allow for the advancement of legal fees is that such
advances are entirely permissive.231 A company may advance
legal expenses in defense of litigation to its officers, directors,
partners or employees, but may also choose not to provide for
advancement at all, or to limit situations in which it would do
so.232 One significant limitation is that defendants seeking
advancement of legal fees prior to the final disposition of a
proceeding may be required to deliver a written undertaking to
repay any funds advanced if it is determined that they are not
entitled to indemnification by the company.233

227
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 355. “The cost of a trial is out of the financial
reach of many white-collar defendants. ‘It is hard to defend a white-collar case for less
than $100,000, and most cost much, much more than that.’” Koppel, supra note 42
(quoting a Georgetown University McDonough School of Business professor).
228
Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211.
229
18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1651 (2004); see also John J. Falvey, Jr. &
Janet E. Taylor, Federal Prosecutors and Advancement of Legal Defense Fees: Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell, BOSTON BAR J., Jan./Feb. 2008, at 14.
230
Homestore, 888 A.2d at 211; Falvey & Taylor, supra note 229, at 14
(arguing that advancement allows directors to act in the best interests of the
corporation while knowing that they can resist meritless suits and not be forced to fund
their own legal defense).
231
18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1651; Bisceglia, supra note 223, at 709-10.
232
18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1651.
233
3A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW
OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §1344.10 (perm. ed., rev. vol. 2002) (discussing statutory
indemnification and advancement in the context of corporations); DEL. CODE. ANN. Tit.
8, § 145(e) (requiring an officer or director to deliver an undertaking to repay legal fees
where a corporation chooses to advance); see also Sr. Tour Players, 853 A.2d at 127 n.5,
129 (discussing the “broad authority” given to limited liability companies and limited
partnerships under Delaware law to set their indemnification provisions and “to
require a written undertaking as a condition to advancement”).
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Thus, while indemnification and advancement may be
correlative, they are “separate and distinct legal actions. [A
defendant’s] right to advancement is not dependent on [his or
her] right to indemnification.”234
[A] corporation may, through its certificate of incorporation or
bylaws, or in a contract specifically addressing the issue, make
mandatory the advancement of expenses to a director or former
director for defending in a covered proceeding. Such a provision may
be enforced as a contract. However, if the applicable corporate
indemnification statute is permissive, then a provision in a
corporation’s bylaws requiring the corporation to indemnify its
directors, officers, employees, and agents to the extent permitted by
law is not mandatory and does not require the corporation to
advance litigation expenses before the termination of the proceeding
in which the expenses were incurred.235

This presents another issue that courts must address:
determining what, if any, provisions regarding indemnification
and advancement exist in a company’s bylaws or partnership
agreement, or in other express contractual agreements, and
then whether any such provision entitles a particular employee
to advancement.236 If a company has no expressly stated
provisions regarding indemnification and advancement in its
corporate bylaws or partnership agreement, this becomes
substantially more difficult.237
As this was the case for KPMG in Stein, the court
overcame this difficulty in two ways. First, the court found that
234

Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212; accord Sr. Tour Players, 853 A.2d at 128.
18B AM. JUR. 2D Corporations § 1651; accord Homestore, 888 A.2d at 212
(stating that while the advancement authority granted by the indemnification statutes
is permissive, “mandatory advancement provisions are set forth in a great many
corporate charters, bylaws and indemnification agreements”).
236
Id. at 213 (“The scope of an advancement proceeding is usually summary
in nature and limited to determining the issue of entitlement in accordance with the
corporation’s own uniquely crafted advancement provisions.”).
237
CALLISON & SULLIVAN, supra note 223 (explaining that partnership
agreements usually contain indemnification provisions where the limited partnership
promises to indemnify for liabilities incurred as a result of partnership business, as
long as the liabilities are not the result of “bad faith, willful misconduct, or gross
negligence” and that these provisions should be drafted to authorize advancement of
litigation costs prior to a determination of liability while requiring repayment if it is
determined that the partner breached the standard of care); see also Sr. Tour Players,
853 A.2d at 130 n.23 (distinguishing between cases where an undertaking by an
employee defendant was not required under Delaware corporate law since
advancement was provided for under a corporation’s specific bylaws and was not
conditioned on an undertaking, and cases where a corporation was entitled to deny
advancement even where the corporate officer offered to submit to an undertaking
since no mandatory advancement provision existed in the certificate of incorporation or
bylaws).
235
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the employees’ expectations of advancement based on KPMG’s
prior practice of advancing legal fees constituted a property
interest with which the government was not permitted to
interfere.238 Second, the court suggested (although it admittedly
declined to decide in this ruling) that all of the defendants were
protected by a contract implied-in-fact (with the exception of
Stein who had an express agreement with the company).239
These conclusions, however, are flawed.
The first flaw is that any expectation the employees’
had based on KPMG’s “long-standing policy,” as well as the
suggestion that a contract implied in fact existed, is misplaced
since one of the stipulations between the government and
KPMG was that the company’s practice of advancing and
paying legal fees prior to February 2004 was “voluntary.”240
Such a voluntary policy suggests that KPMG was free to
exercise its discretion to deny advancement, either during the
investigation or later during criminal proceedings, to any
employee or former employee that it suspected did not act in
good faith and was guilty of a criminal violation.241 Two factual
circumstances in Stein highlight this flaw: First, KPMG
refused to extend payments for legal fees to certain former
employees despite their involvement in the investigation.
Second, KPMG also refused to extend fee payment to current
employees even after the court found a Sixth Amendment
violation in Stein I.
With respect to the first circumstance, one might view
KPMG as having already exercised such discretion under its
voluntary practice when it declined to extend payment of legal
fees to three former employees implicated in the alleged
wrongdoing.242 Two of the former employees had left KPMG
238

Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 366.
Id. at 356, n.119.
240
Id. at 352, 340; see also Stein v. KPMG, LLP, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230
(S.D.N.Y. 2006), rev’d, 486 F.3d 753, 762 n.3 (2d Cir. 2007) (stating in dictum that the
stipulation by the defendants that KPMG chose to voluntarily advance legal fees in the
past arguably estopped them from now arguing that KPMG had a contractual
obligation—”implied or otherwise”—to pay their post-indictment legal fees, and that it
is far from certain that KPMG would “lose on the merits” of any implied contract claim
since the alleged “uniform practice” of paying legal fees for employees consists of “a
single instance in which KPMG paid the legal fees of two partners indicted and
convicted in a 1974 criminal case”).
241
See Advanced Mining Sys., Inc. v. Fricke, 623 A.2d 82, 84-85 (Del. Ch.
1992) (holding that a mandatory indemnification provision in a corporate by-law which
is silent as to advancement does not “deprive the board of its function . . . to evaluate
the corporation’s interest with respect to advancement of expenses”).
242
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2007).
239
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prior to the start of the investigation, but were suspected in the
misconduct partially through conduct prior to their departure
from the firm and partially through their formation of a
separate company which played a “central role in the
transactions at issue.”243 Yet the court in Stein III did not find
the rights of those defendants to have been violated, despite
evidence from the KPMG voicemail that the firm would cover
expenses for “any present and former members of the firm.”244
Therefore, it may be argued that KPMG never intended to
create an expectation that legal fees would be advanced
unconditionally.
The other factual circumstance is that even after the
district court’s finding in Stein I that the government had
violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights, KPMG still
refused to extend payment of the legal expenses for their
defendant employees either voluntarily245 or by conceding a
contractual obligation to do so.246 This is significant because
the Stein I court had viewed stipulations by KPMG to the
AUSAs that it had no legal obligation to pay fees as being
borne of the firm’s own self-interest in avoiding an indictment
and not necessarily out of its actual belief.247 Yet even with the
government’s obstructions removed, KPMG chose to exercise
discretion even with regards to defendants who were current
employees during the course of the suspected criminal wrongdoing. Such considerations cast further doubt on future courts’
efforts to reconcile such claims by attempting to infer what a
company would have done, especially when a company chooses,
243

Id. at 426.
The Stein III court found that it could not be determined that KPMG had
any legal obligation to defend, nor did the defendants show that the firm would have
covered their legal costs “as a matter either of grace or of obligation, given that [they]
left the firm so long ago.” Id. With respect to a third former defendant, the court found
no intention of KPMG to cover his costs due to his departure under “strained
circumstances” from the firm two years before the indictment, and that he had
expressly released KPMG from any claims that he may have had against the firm. Id.
245
See Browning, Judge Raises New Concerns, supra note 200 (reporting a
month after the Stein I decision was handed down that the firm had no intention of
paying the legal fees for its defendant employees because while they had already paid
$12 million in fees to that point, the employees had cost the firm $500 million by
breaching their fiduciary duty).
246
United States v. Stein, 452 F. Supp. 2d 230, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (noting
that KPMG contested claims of a contract implied in fact by asserting that past
decisions regarding payment of employee legal expenses were made pursuant to
“voluntary, unilateral decisions . . . on a case by case basis”).
247
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 345 n.54 (“KPMG had an interest in avoiding
advancement of fees if its legal obligation to do so might be questioned, as the
government might view advancement of fees as protecting culpable personnel.”).
244
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as KPMG did, to change course in its discretion as an
investigation wears on.
A second major flaw in the court’s reasoning regarding
the employees expectations is that KPMG arguably never
intended to advance legal expenses to all employees being
investigated by the DOJ. The only affirmative action taken by
the company regarding advancement was to create an express
contract for the two individuals the company unmistakably
intended to cover: Jeffrey Stein and Richard Smith.248 Such
action undercuts the argument that KPMG impliedly obligated
itself to advance fees to all of its employees connected to the
investigation. A better indication of the company’s true intent
could be ascertained by looking at whether the company
planned for such litigation expense issues by obtaining a
liability insurance policy that provided protection in such
instances.249 Such protection could make indemnification and
advancement through company assets unnecessary.250
248
Id. at 339. See generally Karl E. Stauss, Indemnification in Delaware:
Balancing Policy Goals and Liabilities, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 143 (2004) (pointing out, at
least with corporations, the inherent risks in blanket authorizations and clauses
regarding mandatory advancement).

Mandatory advancement clauses have been broadly interpreted to apply,
even in situations where the advancement request was borne out of a lawsuit
brought by the company providing the advance. Specific contract language is
needed to entitle a person to mandatory advancement. A provision mandating
indemnification “to the full extent permitted by Delaware law” will not
“deprive the board of its function under Section 145(e) to evaluate a
corporation’s interest with respect to advancement of expenses.[“] Where a
bylaw mandates the advance of expenses, it creates a vested right, which
cannot be unilaterally terminated, to advances once a triggering event for
advances occurs. Without a bylaw or contract mandating the advance of
expenses, a board determination to advance their personal litigation expenses
is treated as a self-dealing transaction, governed by entire fairness. “A
rubber-stamp resolution authorizing advances will not pass muster.”
Id. at 163-64 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
249
See David B. Bayless, Defending Your Client in the World of SEC
Enforcement, Part 2: Cooperation and Litigation, SEC. LITIG. REP., Apr. 2006, at 1. The
Bayless article tackles concerns arising from the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s use of the Seaboard Report that are nearly identical to those emanating
from the Thompson Memo, including pressure to cooperate with government
investigations and a requirement that companies, in order to obtain settlements with
the government, not exercise their right to indemnify individuals. Id. For corporations,
this makes the purchase of a director and officer (“D&O”) insurance policy essential. Id.
In addition, when purchasing such policies, companies can elect a “pay as you go”
clause, which would permit advancement of defense costs on a current or quarterly
basis. Id. But see John C. Tanner & David E. Howard, Blowing Whistles and Climbing
Ladders: The Hidden Insurance Issues Behind Sarbanes-Oxley and Recent Corporate
Governance Reform, ACC DOCKET, Apr. 2005, at 32, 35-37 (pointing out that many
policies impose limits on cost coverage of government investigations, may contain
terms that are subject to interpretation regarding coverage of certain costs, and may
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The Court’s Findings Regarding the Threats and
Pressure Imposed by the Government

In addition to finding that KPMG had a policy of
advancing legal fees on which its employees were entitled to
rely, the Stein decisions also focused on the effect that actions
and threats by the government had on KPMG’s desire to
advance fees.251 The court concluded first that the inherent
threat of an indictment for failing to cooperate contained in the
Thompson Memo caused KPMG to consider abandoning its
policy of advancing legal fees, even before it first met with
the AUSAs.252 One premise for this conclusion was the court’s
belief that the Thompson Memo was “binding on all federal
prosecutors.”253 Next, the court found that the threat of
indictment was consistently reinforced by the USAO by
focusing early and often on KPMG’s legal obligations regarding
advancing legal fees and by allowing it to comply only with
those obligations that were demonstrable.254 Third, the court
found that the government’s conduct manifested a desire to
minimize the involvement of defense counsel.255 Finally, the
court determined that the firm’s decision to cease payments to
any indicted employees and the conditions placed on the receipt
of these payments were the product of direct pressure applied
by the government pursuant to the Thompson Memo.256 Again,
however, a number of weaknesses limit the effectiveness of the
court’s decision.
First, KPMG’s fear of prosecution had little, if anything,
to do with the Thompson Memo and more to do with the
government’s general discretion to bring an indictment, which
would have effectively crippled the company. As the Stein I

also contain rescission clauses which deny coverage in the event of particular instances
of conduct, such as restating previously certified financial statements).
250
Bayless, supra note 249. But see William A. Boeck, Don’t Assume D&O
Policy Covers Individuals’ Defense Expenses, BUS. INS., Nov. 6, 2006, at 10 (warning
specifically in the wake of the Stein cases that where prosecutors attack corporate
indemnification of defense expenses, the assumption by many defendants that D&O
policies will fill this gap may be wrong if the policy contains a provision which triggers
payment only once the company begins indemnifying its employees who are subject to
the investigation).
251
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 400.
252
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
253
Id. at 338.
254
Id. at 352; Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 402.
255
See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 352.
256
Id.
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court recognized, this discretion was grounds for concern for
KPMG following the investigation, indictment, and prosecution
of KPMG’s former competitor, Arthur Andersen.257 Since
prosecutorial discretion to seek an indictment against a
company exists independently of the Thompson Memo
guidelines,258 the decision to seek an indictment could hinge on
the government’s satisfaction with a company’s cooperation
irrespective of any procedural requirement259 that it be
considered.
Second, courts attempting to resolve such disputes
regarding the advancement of legal fees risk intruding on the
government’s compelling interest and legitimate discretion in
prosecuting individuals and companies liable for misconduct.260
Prosecutors have broad discretion in determining when and
what charges to bring against a defendant.261 Claims of abuse of
prosecutorial discretion are rarely reviewed as such discretion
is grounded in the separation of powers doctrine of constitutional theory.262 The Stein cases agreed with the need for such
257

Id. at 341; see also supra notes 74, 97 and accompanying text.
See McNulty Statement, supra note 4, at 2 (“Federal prosecutors could
lawfully exercise their discretion to charge a corporation in many instances where we
have stayed our hand.”).
259
The Stein I court found that AUSAs, in determining whether to bring an
indictment against a company under the Thompson Memo, are “obliged” to consider a
company’s cooperation and that the advancement of legal fees are a measurement of
that cooperation. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d. at 338. The court used this logic to
differentiate between the Thompson Memo and the Holder Memo from 1999. Id. As
authority for this holding, however, the court referred to a memorandum from Robert
D. McCallum, Jr., Acting Deputy Attorney General. Memorandum from Robert D.
McCallum, Jr., Deputy Attorney Gen. on Waiver of Corporate Attorney-Client and
Work Product Protection to the Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys (Oct. 21,
2005). However, this memo was dated October 21, 2005—over a year after the IRS
made its criminal referral to the DOJ. Id. The meetings between the AUSAs and
counsel for KPMG took place on February 25, 2004, twenty months before the
McCallum memo. Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 341.
260
See Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 115 n.9 (1988) (“White collar
crime is ‘the most serious and all-pervasive crime problem in America today.’ Although
this statement was made in 1980, there is no reason to think the problem has
diminished in the meantime.” (quoting John Conyers, Jr., Corporate and White-Collar
Crime: A View by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Crime, 17 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 287, 288 (1980)).
261
See Fisher, supra note 74, at 30 (“It is well settled that business entities
may be indicted. . . . Prosecutors have discretion as to whom to prosecute. This
discretion is limited by constitutional considerations . . . . [but otherwise] the
prosecutor is virtually without legal limit as to whom she prosecutes . . . .” (paragraph
break omitted)).
262
Greg Hollon, Note, After the Federalization Binge: A Civil Liberties
Hangover, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 499, 508 (1996); BENNETT L. GERSHMAN,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 4:3, at 4-6 (2d ed. 2001) (cautioning that while judicial
deference to prosecutors arises from the separation of powers doctrine and respect for
258
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discretion, stating that “prosecutors appropriately are given
great latitude in the arguments they make to juries,”263 and
remarking on the importance of the government’s efforts to
obtain cooperation during its investigations:
Any government’s interest in investigating and fairly prosecuting
crime is compelling. . . . In order properly to accomplish that task,
the government must have the ability to make just charging
decisions and to prevent obstruction of its investigations. Hence, no
one disputes the proposition that a willingness to cooperate with the
government is an appropriate consideration in deciding whether to
charge an entity. Nor does anyone suggest that an entity’s
obstruction of a government investigation . . . should be ignored in a
charging decision.264

In the post-Enron environment of company accountability, this government interest is also seen through the increased
use of regulation designed to provide greater oversight of
company conduct.265 Legislatures and administrative agencies
have responded to a surge in white collar crime in recent years
with statutes that increase transparency and reporting
requirements and enhance criminal penalties for fraudulent
conduct.266 However, as white collar corruption becomes
increasingly complex, prosecution of such conduct remains an
essential enforcement and deterrence mechanism.267 While

prosecutorial expertise, “[t]he combination of prosecutorial discretion and judicial
passivity can be dangerous”).
263
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 359.
264
Id. at 363; see also Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 427.
265
See McNulty Statement, supra note 4 (arguing that following the outbreak
of corporate scandals after the collapse of Enron, the DOJ’s ensuing “vigor and action”
in prosecuting corporate crime along with congressional reform “have helped to instill a
climate of accountability in corporate boardrooms, and to restore investors’ confidence
in the integrity of our markets”).
266
See, e.g., Sarbanes Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(establishing penalties for criminal fraud in corporate record keeping in Title VIII, and
increasing criminal penalties for mail and wire fraud, as well as under federal
sentencing guidelines for white-collar offenses under Title IX); Disclosure of Proxy
Voting Policies and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment
Companies, Securities Act Release No. 8188, Exchange Act Release No. 47,304,
Investment Company Act Release No. 25,922 (Jan. 31, 2003) (requiring mutual fund
companies to provide disclosures on proxy voting policies relating to portfolio securities
they hold, due in part to recent corporate scandals that have generated new investor
interest in issues of corporate governance, as well as due to increased voting power
that mutual funds enjoy as major shareholders and their effects on corporate
accountability).
267
See Fisher, supra note 74, at 31 (commenting on accuracy and credibility in
financial reporting, the effects of distrust on shareholders, creditors, managers and
regulators, and the potential need to make an example of Arthur Andersen); see also
Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1106 (“Satisfaction of the government’s interests of
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abuse of prosecutorial discretion and the potential for vindictiveness by prosecutors are important concerns,268 forcing
courts to evaluate such claims creates the risk that courts will
overstep judicial authority under the separation of powers
doctrine.269
A third weakness limiting the effectiveness of the
court’s holding is that decisions like those in Stein I and III
may serve as catalysts for prosecutors to use alternative
methods to obtain company cooperation, making legal fee
advancement a moot point. The DOJ and USAO were chastised
in Stein for placing an unfair burden on the individual
KPMG defendants by denying them access to a source of funds
they were lawfully entitled to for purposes of presenting a
defense.270 However, the defendants’ access to these funds was
subject to a second limitation: availability. Should a criminal
indictment render a company insolvent, a separate burden
would be placed on defendants wishing to gain access to these
funds.271
The negative financial impact that a formal indictment
against a company has on that company’s assets and
survivability may give prosecutors an interest in not seeking
an indictment against that company.272 However, frustrating
government investigations of illegal activity by burdening their
acquisition of cooperation from a legitimate additional
defendant—in this case the company—creates a risk that the
government will simply bring an indictment, potentially
rendering a company (as in the case of Arthur Andersen)

retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation and restitution through the prosecution of
culpable individuals will weigh against prosecution of the business entity.”).
268
Fisher, supra note 74, at 32 (discussing how prosecutors can obtain
indictments with “relative ease” and by using “questionable or even contrived
evidence”); see also, Hollon, supra note 262, at 508 (stating that a prosecutor’s charging
decisions are entitled to the presumption that they were made in good faith); Note,
Prosecutorial Vindictiveness in the Criminal Appellate Process: Due Process Protection
After United States v. Goodwin, 81 MICH. L. REV. 194, 195-96 (1982).
269
Hollon, supra note 262, at 508.
270
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
271
See Tanner & Howard, supra note 249, at 46 (arguing that even where
employees such as in-house attorneys have mandatory indemnification through state
law or written agreements, “individual financial resources will be at risk if the
company files for bankruptcy or becomes insolvent”); Bisceglia, supra note 223, at 71011.
272
See Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 3 (explicitly raising adverse risks to
shareholders, pension holders, and innocent employees as factors to consider in
deciding whether to charge a company); McNulty Statement, supra note 4.
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insolvent.273 This will place the burden of legal fees more
heavily on defendants who would otherwise have sought
company funds.274 Even assuming prosecutors did abuse their
discretion in seeking an indictment, it is arguable whether a
reversal or the dropping of any charges would restore the
company’s financial position.275
This Note does not claim that the Stein court erred in its
conclusions, or misrepresented the issues in arriving at its
holdings. It merely seeks to present the wealth of issues,
arguments, and claims that could be made in response to the
ruling issued by the Stein court, as well as may be made to
other courts in similar, if not identical, situations moving
forward.276 In the face of these complications related to judicial
reconciliation of legal fee disputes for defendants charged with
corporate crime, an easier solution is needed.277
273

See Irvin B. Nathan & Michael S. Lewis, Will the Recent KPMG Decisions
Change White-Collar Defense? BUS. CRIMES BULL., Oct. 18, 2006 (arguing that
companies “with an instinct for self-preservation[] may well recognize that advancing
legal fees to indicted individuals is only likely to antagonize prosecutors who have
discretion to indict the company”); Koppel, supra note 42; Fisher, supra note 74, at 3031, 32.
274
See Bisceglia, supra note 223, at 699 (arguing for the procurement of D&O
liability insurance because “no matter how well disposed the board may be toward the
embattled director, the corporation may have its own financial troubles and thus be
unable to help him”).
275
See Fisher, supra note 74, at 32; see also Nathan & Lewis, supra note 273
(stating that while the Stein decision was highly acclaimed, “it may ultimately produce
little change in the world of white-collar criminal defense” since “the risk of a lawsuit
for fees is far outweighed by the risk of alienating prosecutors by funding the legal
defense of their quarry”).
276
See, e.g., United States v. Galante, No. 3:06CR161, 2006 WL 3826701, at
*3 (D. Conn. Nov 28, 2006) (differentiating Stein in a case concerning federal
prosecutors’ use of a legislative forfeiture provision). However, one can only hope that
situations presenting similar fact patterns will be extremely limited; see also Nathan &
Lewis, supra note 273 (projecting that the Stein I decision will “prompt corporate
policy-makers to rethink charter and bylaw provisions and their past practices relating
to reimbursement of legal fees to indicted or targeted officers, directors or employees”).
277
In December 2006, in order to bring the guidelines listed in the Thompson
Memo into compliance with the decision handed down in Stein, the DOJ issued a
revised memorandum instructing prosecutors that they “generally should not take into
account whether a corporation is advancing attorneys’ fees to employees or agents
under investigation and indictment.” Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy
Attorney Gen. to the Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys (Dec., 2006)
[hereinafter, McNulty Memo]; see also Jason McLure, Justice Officials Moderate
Thompson Memo Tactics, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 13, 2006, at 1. However the new guidelines,
which still permit prosecutors to consider fee advancement in certain circumstances,
have already come under criticism for their inadequacy since prosecutors seeking to
consider fee advancement in their decisions to indict can obtain this permission from
the Deputy Attorney General, which essentially still leaves the decision in the
discretion of the prosecutors. See id. (reporting that obtaining permission to consider
fee advancement is less rigorous than obtaining permission to push companies to waive
privilege); Lynnley Browning, U.S. Moves to Restrain Prosecutors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
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PROPOSING A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION

In arriving at its final conclusions, the court in the Stein
cases engaged in a long and complicated analysis of the arguments presented by both the government and the defendants,
while also balancing policy concerns. The court rejected the
government’s claim that the right to counsel does not include
the right to spend other people’s money.278 However, the government’s argument indirectly presents a more viable solution for
balancing its interest in preventing the obstructive use of legal
fee advancement and a defendant’s right to use a lawful source
of funding to secure counsel and mount a defense. This solution
is the use of preliminary injunctive relief in future government
claims of obstructive fee advancement by employers to
employees. Such relief would be similar to the injunctions
granted under current legislative forfeiture provisions.279
A.

Use of Legislative Injunctive Restraints

The use of legislative preliminary injunctions, similar to
those at issue in Caplin and Monsanto,280 is a superior
alternative to the approach taken by the Thompson Memo
because it reduces the risk of subsequent disputes among the
government, employers, and their employees over the advancement of legal fees while withstanding constitutional scrutiny of
Sixth Amendment claims. Such injunctions also alleviate the
burden on future courts forced to reconcile similar claims and
arguments, and they preserve a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
rights prior to the need for judicial intervention to restore what
the government has violated. This alternative would also
minimize judicial intrusion on prosecutorial discretion, while at
the same time limiting over-zealous prosecutors. This in turn
reduces the risk of damage to legitimate criminal prosecutions
caused by suppression of statements and other evidence and, in

2006, at C1; Martha Neil, Thompson Memo Changes Not Enough, ABA Says, A.B.A. J.
& REP., Dec. 15, 2006 (reporting the inadequacy of the new policy for waiver, which
requires only “high level department approval”).
278
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
279
See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989);
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
280
See discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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cases like Stein, forced dismissal of unprosecuted criminal
indictments should be tried on their merits.281
The legislative injunction at issue in Caplin and
Monsanto, which this Note suggests as a model, is the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act (“CCE”).282 The CCE is one
of two federal criminal statutes that were amended by the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (“CFA”)283 to give greater
effect to government efforts to fight different types of crime.284
The CCE, as modified by the CFA, authorizes the forfeiture of
“property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds . . .
obtained . . . as the result of such [drug] violation[s].”285
Included in such property is the forfeiture of any “interest in,
claims against, and property or contractual rights affording a
source of control over, the continuing criminal enterprise.”286
The statute also declares that any “right, title, and interest” in
the property obtained via a violation of the drug law “vests
in the United States upon the commission of the act giving
rise to forfeiture” even when those assets are subsequently
transferred to a third party.287
The forfeiture statute has a significant preemptive
feature. This feature gives the government the ability to apply
for a restraining order or injunction in order “to preserve the
availability of [the] property” either upon the filing of an
indictment or information charging a violation, or prior to the
filing of an indictment or information if the court determines
that there is a substantial probability that the U.S. will prevail
on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to restrain the
property will result in its being made unavailable.288 The court
must also weigh the need to preserve the property against
281
Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d at 427 (“This indictment charges serious crimes.
They should have been decided on the merits as to every defendant.”).
282
21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (2006).
283
Id. § 881(e).
284
See Roderick D. Vereen, Comment, Attorneys Rights to Fees Under the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: The “Bona Fide Purchaser,” 16 S.U. L. REV. 407,
408-09 (1989) (“[The CFA] revised the forfeiture provisions of both the RICO and the
CCE statutes. . . . which attack[] the enterprises of drug trafficking and racketeering. . . . Congress believed that since profit and economic power were the motivating
factors for this type of criminal activity enforcement of those statutes would strip these
offenders and organizations of this economic power.”).
285
21 U.S.C. §853(a)(1) (2006).
286
Id. § 853(a)(3).
287
Id. § 853(c). However, an exception applies when the third party who has
obtained the assets proves that he or she is a “bona fide purchaser” of the property
“reasonably without cause to believe” it is forfeitable. Id.
288
Id. § 853(e).
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the hardship on the individual whose assets have been
“preserved.”289 The duration of the restraint is limited to ninety
days, unless either good cause is shown to the court to extend
the order, or an indictment is filed against the individual.290
A carefully drawn statutory enactment allowing the
government, with certain limitations, to request that companies be enjoined from advancing legal fees to certain employees
can achieve the goals of easing judicial reconciliation,
preserving defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and
limiting intrusion on prosecutorial discretion, while also
addressing other policy concerns. Such a provision would
consist of two parts. The first part would allow prosecutors,
after initiating a formal investigation against an employee
suspected of wrongdoing in the capacity of his employment, to
seek, subject to limitations, a preliminary injunction from a
court barring the advancement of legal fees from the employer
to that employee. Like the CCE, the government would not be
required to bring an indictment against the individual
employee or the company. However, in order for the court to
grant such an injunction, the government would be required to
show to the magistrate evidence sufficient to obtain an indictment against the company and a substantial likelihood that the
fee advancement is being used for the purpose of obstructing
the government’s investigation. In addition, all injunction
requests would allow potential defendants as well as their
employers to rebut the government’s claims through presentation of evidence sufficient to show either a lack of obstructive
conduct or excessive hardship to the potential defendant.
The first part of this proposed injunction provision
accomplishes two goals. First, it preserves the government’s
interest in obtaining cooperation and preventing obstruction by
giving prosecutors the authority to seek judicial intervention in
the prevention of companies using fee advancement as a mode
of improperly obstructing a criminal investigation.291 At the
same time, the government’s interest would be sufficiently
checked by setting a minimum on what must be proven to

289

Id. § 853(e)(1)(B)(ii).
Id.
291
See Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1146 (discussing the DOJ’s “more
aggressive pursuit of obstructive conduct since the Thompson Memo’s issuance,” but
also arguing that companies which impede investigators have for a long time been
more likely to face criminal prosecution at the hands of the Justice Department).
290
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establish the necessary urgency implicating that interest.292
Second, this provision would preserve the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel for individual defendants by placing the
burden on the government to show good cause for judicial interference with a company’s right to advance fees to its employees.
It also removes the government’s unrestrained consideration of
legal fee advancement in its evaluation of a company’s
cooperation, alleviating the threat contained in the Thompson
Memo of prosecutors seeking an indictment against the
company.293 Should the court grant the injunction, the company
would have no choice but to comply. Should the court deny the
injunction, prosecutors would be otherwise barred, both before
and after the denial of the motion, from considering fee
advancement in deciding whether or not to seek an indictment.
The second part of the injunction provision would place
additional limits on when such an injunction would be appropriate. First, prosecutors would not be permitted to request an
injunction when it would be construed as forcing an employer
to violate the terms of a statutory obligation requiring the
advancement of legal fees. Second, prosecutors would not be
able to seek an injunction that would intrude on any insurance
policy obtained by the company from a third party insurer for
the purpose of guaranteeing the availability of advanced legal
fees. Third, prosecutors would be unable to seek an injunction
when a company already has an existing uncontradicted and
express agreement with its employees to advance legal fees,
unless prosecutors can show that the agreement was put in
place for purposes of obstructing the government’s investigation. In such a case the government would be required to prove
the obstruction in accordance with part one of the provision.
Courts would also be required to weigh the government’s
interest in injunctive relief against any hardship to the
defendant and could limit the time period of any restraint
based on those perceived hardships. Finally, if none of the
292

See Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 363 (conceding the need of the government
to prevent obstruction in its criminal investigations, but pointing out that “the
Thompson Memorandum does not say that payment of legal fees may cut in favor of
indictment only if it is used as a means to obstruct an investigation”). “If the
government means to take the payment of legal fees into account in making charging
decisions only where the payments are part of an obstruction scheme—and thereby
narrowly tailor its means to its ends—it would be easy enough to say so.” Id. at 364.
293
See Wray & Hur, supra note 2, at 1103 (stating that the use of alternatives
such as “pre-trial diversion” agreements or “deferred prosecution and non-prosecution
agreements,” encourages greater cooperation by removing the “all-or-nothing choice
between indicting (and destroying) a company and giving it a complete ‘pass’”).
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above limitations apply and if the court finds that abrogation
of fee advancement is necessary, nothing in the injunction
provision would intrude on a company’s right or obligation to
indemnify its employees at the conclusion of any litigation in
accordance with any obligation imposed by statute or by a
company’s bylaws, partnership agreement, or other express
contractual obligations.
These limitations accomplish a number of goals. The
first limitation protects the interests of states that wish to
preserve the use of indemnification and fee advancement as a
significant inducement to attract capable individuals to
positions of high responsibility in a company.294 The second and
third limitations prevent companies that may only be subject to
permissive statutes dealing with fee advancement from being
effectively punished by prosecutors for their attempts to plan
for such a contingency, while encouraging other companies that
have not yet done so to undertake one of these options in an
effort to eliminate the issue from consideration going
forward.295 All three limitations would constitute express legal
obligations of companies to advance legal fees—obligations that
the Thompson Memo had recognized by prohibiting prosecutors
from considering such mandatory payments as a failure to
cooperate. Thus, prosecutors would be in no worse position
than they had voluntarily undertaken under the Thompson
Memo,296 while also receiving an additional tool to combat a
company’s obstruction under the guise of cooperation. The
expensive nature of complex white-collar criminal litigation,
such as that presented in the Stein cases, would also be taken
into consideration by courts evaluating hardship to defendants.

294

See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
See Jonathan C. Dickey, Recent Decisions Concerning the Right of
Advancement of Defense Costs, SEC. LITIG. REP., Feb. 2006, at 6 (explaining while
companies can do only so much to mitigate the risk of being punished by prosecutors
for supporting officers and directors through indemnification and advancement, certain
steps such as amending company bylaws to make advancement mandatory; contractual
exclusions eliminating the obligation to advance fees to employees who plead guilty to
criminal misconduct; and purchasing non-rescindable D&O liability insurance are
some suggestions to preserve the right to pay for the defense of officers and employees);
see also Falvey & Taylor, supra note 229, at 16.
296
Thompson Memo, supra note 1; McNulty Statement, supra note 4
(removing from consideration a company’s statutory obligation to pay employee defense
costs in the government’s evaluation of that company’s cooperation).
295
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Arguments Against and Rebuttals in Favor of the Use
of Injunctive Restraints

While this Note proposes using injunctive restraint as a
tool against obstructive fee advancement, injunctive provisions
similar to the one proposed have been increasingly criticized
out of concerns pertaining to prosecutorial abuse as well as
risks regarding availability and adequacy of counsel.297 The
first criticism is that such injunctive provisions have
undesirable impacts on the adversarial criminal justice
system.298 The argument is that such provisions remove any
incentive for private criminal defense attorneys to represent
defendants whose assets are subject to pre-trial restraint
because the defendant’s ability to cover his legal expenses is
suddenly called into question.299 Under forfeiture provisions
involving drug offenses, if the defendant is convicted, the
restrained assets would become forfeited, potentially leaving
nothing to cover attorney’s fees.300 Critics might argue that the
proposal suggested by this Note creates a similar risk through
the possibility that defendants who are found guilty would no
longer be entitled to indemnification from their respective
companies, a notable concern where defense costs can reach
extraordinary levels.301
A second argument against the use of an injunction
provision is that such a restraint on a defendant’s assets has a
direct implication on his or her Sixth Amendment right to
counsel of choice and, more indirectly, on the right to the
effective assistance of counsel.302 Third, it may be argued that
297

See Winick, supra note 192; Berube, supra note 110, at 1395.
Winick, supra note 192, at 771-72, 777; Lisa F. Rackner, Against Forfeiture
of Attorney’s Fees Under RICO: Protecting the Constitution’s Rights of Criminal
Defendants, 61 NYU L. REV. 124, 126-27 (1986).
299
Berube, supra note 110, at 1395; Winick, supra note 192, at 779, 785. The
argument is that many private criminal defense attorneys require a fee that
defendants cannot afford to pay if their assets are seized. Id. at 773. This argument is
furthered in the sense that criminal defendants whose assets are subject to forfeiture
and have been frozen prior to an indictment, can claim indigency, and have counsel
appointed to them, while defendants whose assets have not been frozen are unable to
claim indigency, are unable to retain counsel since “lawyers will refuse to represent
him, fearing subsequent forfeiture of their fees.” Rackner, supra note 298, at 134.
300
This concern is increased by the requirement that the illegal assets
transferred to a third party are also subject to forfeiture, including legal fees paid to
defense attorneys. Vereen, supra note 284, at 409.
301
See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
302
Winick, supra note 192, at 784-85, 800-01 (arguing that, even where courts
have accepted government contentions that giving defendants who have had their
assets forfeited appointed counsel satisfies the requirements of the Sixth Amendment,
298
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such an injunctive provision would not remove the risk of abuse
by prosecutors seeking pre-trial freezing of assets in order to
purposely eliminate a defendant’s chosen defense counsel.303
However, these arguments are weakened by a number of
considerations.
1. Overcoming Negative Impacts on the Adversarial
Criminal Justice System
First, the arguments regarding the impact of preemptive restraints and forfeiture on the adversary system rely on
the assumption that private defense attorneys will be hesitant
to represent defendants out of the fear that they either will not
be paid or that the government will forfeit those fees that have
already been already paid.304 Second, the argument also relies
on the absence of any exception for legitimate attorney’s fees305
and the overly broad use of seizures and injunctions by prosecutors in freezing the defendant’s personal assets, making no
distinction between those which are tainted by the illegality
and those which are legitimate. The effect is to leave the defendants with little or no other source to finance their defense.306

“[a] criminal justice system relying on appointed rather than retained counsel . . . is not
the adversary system contemplated by the sixth amendment, no matter how effective
such appointed advocates are”).
303
Id. at 777-78 (arguing that such a result was neither anticipated nor
intended by Congress); Peter W. Salsich, III, A Delicate Balance: Making Criminal
Forfeiture a Viable Law Enforcement Tool And Satisfying Due Process After United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 39 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 585, 586 (1995). This
was also an express concern and conclusion of the Stein court when it ruled that one of
the purposes of the AUSAs in exerting such pressure on KPMG pursuant to the
Thompson Memo was their “desire to minimize the involvement of defense attorneys.”
Stein I, 435 F. Supp. 2d at 353.
304
Winick, supra note 192, at 777-81; Berube, supra note 110, at 1395.
305
While an exception is carved out under the CCE for bona fide recipients of
potentially forfeitable funds who are without cause to believe that the received funds
are forfeitable, supra note 287, defense attorneys are almost always excluded from this
category. Winick, supra note 192, at 785 (“[C]riminal defense lawyers are almost
inevitably on notice that their clients’ payments may be from the proceeds of crime.”);
Vereen, supra note 284, at 410-11; see also supra note 296.
306
See Jon E. Gordon, Prosecutors Who Seize Too Much and the Theories They
Love: Money Laundering, Facilitation, and Forfeiture, 44 DUKE L.J. 744, 744-45 (1995)
(“Since 1970, federal prosecutors have increasingly relied on civil and criminal
forfeiture as tools for law enforcement. . . . [This] gives prosecutors undesirable power
to seize property.”); see also Winick, supra note 192, at 770-71 (arguing that the ease
with which prosecutors obtain pre-trial restraining orders combined with the threat of
post-conviction forfeiture of assets “have deterred or prevented private criminal
defense attorneys from taking such cases,” and give prosecutors “almost unfettered
discretion to deprive defendants of the use of their assets to hire counsel of choice”).
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However, the solution proposed in this Note assuages these
concerns.
The injunction provision proposed here would actually
give private defense counsel less reason to hesitate since it is
not concerned with the seizure of illegal, and therefore forfeitable, assets such as in drug cases, but rather with preventing
legal assets from being used for illegal purposes. As a result,
the provision would not subject fees already paid to defense
attorneys to any retroactive forfeiture by the government and
would only apply to the further advancement of legal fees
from the employer to the employee, leaving the employee’s
personal assets unaffected. Thus, the employee would be free to
expend his own assets in retaining an attorney for his
defense307 since all sources of personal financial income, such as
an employee’s salary and investment income (assuming no
other illegitimacy) are preserved. As a result, private defense
counsel would receive some compensation from the defendant’s
personal assets, while still retaining the prospect of indemnification at the conclusion of the trial, alleviating at least some
of the risk that attorneys will be deterred from representing
such defendants.308 Additionally, not subjecting fees already
paid to retroactive forfeiture and preservation of a defendant’s
personal assets prevents prosecutors from sweeping too broadly
in their application of such a provision.309

307
Winick, supra note 192, at 811 (“[The problem] is not whether exercise of
the right to counsel of choice can be regulated, such as by restrictions on the choice of
counsel who is otherwise engaged in order to prevent undue delay, or on the choice of
an attorney disqualified by a factor such as a conflict of interest. Rather, it is whether
the right may be completely destroyed by governmental action that renders the
defendant unable to choose any private counsel.”). Since the provision leaves a
defendant’s personal assets intact, such a concern would not be implicated under this
proposal. As critics such as Winick note, “There is a vast difference between overriding
a defendant’s choice of a particular lawyer and preventing him from employing any
lawyer at all.” Id.
308
See Browning, Judges Press, supra note 33 (reporting that in at least one
white collar criminal case against a former Enron accountant, retained defense counsel
continued to represent the defendant at a “small fraction of his usual charges” because
he was “convinced of her innocence”); Stein III, 495 F. Supp. 2d 390, 423-24 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (finding that while some of the KPMG defendants had gone into debt in financing
their defenses, most of the defendants were in “better financial circumstances,” and
only one was threatened with a motion to withdraw by their chosen counsel).
309
One example of the broad application of forfeiture provisions in criminal
cases is seen in charges of money laundering where, when dealing with assets subject
to forfeiture, “dirty money” that is tainted by the alleged illegality is mixed with “clean
money” that is unconnected. Gordon, supra note 306, at 744. When prosecutors have
great difficulty sorting the dirty from the clean, they may attempt to try and seize it
all. Id. at 744-45.
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2. Overcoming Negative Impacts on Rights to Counsel
of Choice and Effective Assistance of Counsel
Second, criticism based on the impact of injunctive
restraint on a defendant’s rights to counsel of choice and the
effective assistance of counsel is also addressed by the
provision suggested in this Note. Part of this concern is based,
again, on current forfeiture provisions which leave defendants
with no other source of funding for their defense.310 Another
source of this concern, however, is that private defense
attorneys who agree to take on such cases are presented with a
conflict of interest by having a pecuniary interest in the
outcome of a criminal litigation.311 However, the narrow
application of the provision recommended here subverts these
concerns. Under this proposal, prosecutors would be unable to
request a restraint of fee advancement in cases where such a
restraint contravenes a statutory obligation imposed by the
state or impinges on a company’s clearly demonstrated legal
obligation to its employees through express provisions in their
bylaws or other contractual agreement. This provision would
therefore protect any property interest claim in fee advancement that an employee may have.312 To the extent that the
government can seek such a restraint, it would be limited to
the prosecutor’s ability to show that the fee advancement is
being used for purposes of, or in connection with, efforts to
obstruct their investigation, in which case the advancement
would further an illegal interest not protected under the
Constitution. Thus, even where a company is not protected by a
prior existing legal obligation, either contractual or statutory,
as long as their voluntary advancement of fees to investigated
employees is done in good faith, the government will not be
permitted to intrude.

310
See Winick, supra note 192, at 785; Rackner, supra note 298, at 135;
Berube, supra note 110, at 1395.
311
Rackner, supra note 298, at 140-41 (arguing that such a conflict could
violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel); Winick, supra
note 192, at 776-77 (discussing the added risk that defense attorneys will be
representing a criminal defendant on a contingency basis, presenting an ethical
violation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct).
312
To the extent that a company uses a third party insurer to provide
indemnification and advancement protection in the event of litigation, the problem
could be avoided entirely.
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3. Overcoming Risks of Prosecutorial Abuse
Third, the limitations in the proposal address the
concerns of prosecutorial abuse.313 These arguments are based
on a number of factors. The first is that prosecutors have
increasingly relied on forfeiture provisions in their efforts to
fight crimes such as money laundering, racketeering, drug
trafficking, and mail or wire fraud.314 The second is that as this
reliance has increased, so has prosecutors’ dependency on
theories315 that allow them to sweep more broadly in order to
seize and restrain a larger portion of a defendant’s assets while
also enjoying a low burden of proof to establish the grounds
necessary to implement the restraint.316 The provision proposed
here eliminates these risks of abuse for a number of reasons.
First, prosecutorial reliance on this provision will be
limited since, as was originally intended in the Thompson
Memo, it is intended to assist prosecutors in deciding when to
bring criminal charges against a company. As the memo itself
stated, instances in which a company will be subject to indictment will be only in a minority of cases.317 Second, by
placing the decision in the hands of a court, theoretically the
only thing the prosecution can do to abridge the advancement
of legal fees is request an injunction.318 Until the court grants
313
See Gordon, supra note 306, at 744-45 (warning against giving prosecutors
“undesirable power to seize property”); Salsich, supra note 303, at 585-86.
314
Gordon, supra note 306, at 744.
315
An example of this is prosecutorial use of certain theories such as “taint” or
“facilitation.” See id. at 744-45. The premise behind these theories is that prosecutors
seeking the restraint of “dirty” money obtained as a result of money laundering or drug
transactions will also seize “clean” money, not obtained through these activities by
claiming either that the clean money was used to facilitate the illegal transaction, or
that the dirty money was commingled with the clean money, causing it to be tainted
and subject to forfeiture. Id. at 755.
316
Id. at 749. Under a number of forfeiture provisions prosecutors use, only a
standard of probable cause is required to effectuate the restraint. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.
§ 853 (e)(2) (1994) (allowing the government to obtain a pre-indictment temporary
restraining without notice or opportunity for a hearing order upon a showing of
probable cause that the property is forfeitable, and that notice would jeopardize the
availability of the property for forfeiture); see also Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 615; Gordon,
supra note 306, at 749-50.
317
Thompson Memo, supra note 1, at 1.
318
In this way, such a proposal also alleviates a potential conflict of interest
created by the McNulty Memo, which requires prosecutors wishing to consider fee
advancement as a failure to cooperate to obtain permission from the Deputy Attorney
General. See supra note 277. By requiring a court to consider the merits of an
injunction on the advancement of legal fees from employers to employees, this
provision inserts the objectiveness of a neutral magistrate, eliminating the risk of
abuse by prosecutors. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-55
(1971) (invalidating a warrant authorizing the Fourth Amendment search and seizure
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one, companies are free to advance. Third, as preserving the
availability of forfeitable property is not a concern, a higher
burden of proof, such as a “clear and convincing evidence” standard, should be required to establish the necessary presumption of obstruction to warrant the issuance of an injunction.
This would require prosecutors to be more selective and
present only the more egregious cases of potential misconduct.
Furthermore, even critics of current forfeiture provisions
have acknowledged that prosecutors advancing attenuated
claims have achieved only limited success in court with such
theories.319 Thus, vesting the decision in the hands of a court
serves as an effective barrier to prosecutorial abuse. Finally,
binding prosecutors to a higher burden of proof to show intent
on the part of the company to commit obstruction ensures that
some measure of evidence and not mere conclusory statements
will further limit risks of prosecutorial abuse. While this may
seem like a substantial limitation to put on prosecutors, should
a motion for the restraint of fee advancement be denied and
should company conduct warrant such an action, prosecutors
would still possess the ability to seek an indictment against
the company for obstruction. This would serve as an effective
deterrent to misconduct on the part of the employer.
VI.

CONCLUSION

In the effort to reform the balance among prosecutors,
individual defendants, and the role of private companies in
white collar criminal cases, special concerns must be granted to
the interests of all parties involved. The ability to place
limits on prosecutorial abuse, establish effective deterrents
to company misbehavior, and encourage companies subject to
white-collar criminal investigations to plan for contingencies
not only helps to remove barriers to an effectuation of the
of a defendant’s automobile where it is not issued by a “neutral and detached
magistrate,” and holding that a state’s Attorney General cannot serve as a neutral,
detached magistrate for the purpose of determining probable cause and issuing
warrants). “[T]he whole point of [this] basic rule . . . is that prosecutors and policemen
simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to their own
investigations—the ‘competitive enterprise’ that must rightly engage their singleminded attention.” Id. at 450.
319
Gordon, supra note 306, at 760 (“Prosecutors have enjoyed mixed success
in achieving forfeiture . . . under [a civil forfeiture provision] under the facilitation
theory. . . . [S]everal courts have applied the theory to justify forfeiture . . . [while] [o]n
the other hand, most attempts to apply the theory to accounts containing proceeds of
other offenses have failed, and some courts have rejected the theory altogether.”).
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interests for all involved, but also preserves the ideal of
the adversary system—assessing responsibility for culpable
conduct and meting out proper punishment while ensuring a
fair trial for defendants. While the court in Stein was forced to
embark on an arduous fact-finding process in order to resolve
competing interests on both sides of the investigation, a more
balanced and direct approach, which preserves the interests on
both sides and reduces the risk of disputes and abuse, presents
a superior alternative for courts to resolve future controversies
over these matters.
This Note analyzed the resolutions the Stein court had
to make with respect to the actions and intentions of the
government, KPMG, and the KPMG employees who were
subject to the investigation; the company’s obligations to its
employees; and the company’s reaction to the Thompson Memo.
The court struggled to apply these facts in its determination of
the employees’ rights to effective assistance and counsel of
choice under the Sixth Amendment and of the scope of the
protections afforded by those rights. The difficulties of such a
piecemeal, fact-intensive analysis demonstrate the need for a
clearer alternative.
The injunctive provision proposed here would simplify
this process for future courts by removing from contention
many of the disputed issues in Stein. The proposed provision
would encourage both the government and private employers to
preempt these contentions and refrain from abusive conduct.
The narrowly drawn injunctive provision suggested should also
assuage fears of abuse that arise with respect to similar
provisions in other criminal contexts. The injection of the court
as an intermediary to ensure an early and neutral consideration of the facts presented and the interests implicated would
significantly limit, or at least ease the resolution of, Sixth
Amendment violations to the right to the assistance of counsel
pertaining to the advancement of legal fees from employers to
employees.
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